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THE COURT: [I]n order to finalize this case, we're required to
waive your appeal rights. Do you, in fact, waive your appeal
rights?
MR. OGUL [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, that has not been
part of the negotiation.
THE COURT: It's got to be.
MR. OGUL: It has never been made a part of the negotiation.
THE COURT: Wait, wait. Let's not argue about it, Mr. Ogul.
MS. BACKERS [Prosecutor]: It's part of the deal.
THE COURT: Every felony plea I've been taking in here for
the last six months-he has to waive his appeal rights. If Mr.
Cameron does not want to waive his appeal rights, we do not
have a disposition, and I'm sending the case back to Judge McKinstry. That's the way it is.'
Plea bargaining2 is the bedrock upon which modem criminal justice practice rests. Its evolution as the predominant model of criminal
case adjudication has resulted in a system where criminal trials are the
exception rather than the rule-a trial court model based almost exclusively on negotiation rather than litigation.3 In recent years, a relatively new feature of plea bargaining practice has emerged which now
threatens to render appeals nearly as rare a phenomenon as trials
have become under the old model. This new aspect of the practicewhich is illustrated by the extract above-is the increasingly prevalent
requirement that a criminal defendant waive the right to appeal as a
condition of any plea bargain.
Since more than eight out of ten criminal cases are disposed of by
some form of plea arrangement,4 the inevitable consequence of such
widespread insistence upon appeal waivers will be the removal of an
enormous percentage of criminal cases from appellate review. The
doors of the trial court could gradually close to scrutiny from above
and we could find ourselves moving one step closer to an administrative model of criminal case resolution in which neither factual nor
1. People v. Cameron, No. 101512, slip op. at 2-3 (Alameda County Super. Ct. May
17, 1991) (Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing).
2. Plea bargaining has been defined as "the exchange of prosecutorial, judicial or
other official concessions for pleas of guilty." Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role
in Plea Bargaining,Part1, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1059 n.1 (1976) [hereinafter Judge's

Role].
3. Although figures vary, most sources estimate that 85% to 90% of criminal cases
are disposed of by some form of plea bargain. See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 n.1 (Frank J. Remington
ed., 1966); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, PleaBargainingas Contract,101 YALE L.J.
1909,1909 n.1 (1992); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SouRcBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS.
Tics 502 table 5.25 (Kathleen McGuire et al. eds., 1990).
4. See supra note 3.
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legal issues are resolved by the courts, but rather by the parties
through a process of negotiation. This development conflicts with our
traditional notion that judicial safeguards are needed in the application of penal sanctions and should be examined thoroughly before we
signal assent.
Appeal waivers are not an entirely new entry upon the plea bargaining scene.: In fact, reported cases adjudicating the validity of such
waivers date back to United States Supreme Court approval of the
plea bargaining system itself.6 Despite this pedigree, such waivers
were often described as "uncommon" 7 and "not a widespread practice" 8 for most of their early development, and case law on the subject
was sparse.9
Appeal waivers are far from "uncommon" today. In many jurisdictions, judges 10 and prosecutors" routinely insist upon such waivers
as a virtual precondition to plea bargaining. Elsewhere, one finds
open advocacy on the part of appellate courts' 2 and prosecutors 13 for
5. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 512 P.2d 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); People v. Butler,
204 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); People v. Ramos, 292 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div.

1968).
6. The turning point in U.S. Supreme Court treatment of plea bargaining is generally
understood to be the so-called "Brady trilogy": Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790 (1970). In these three companion cases, the Supreme Court gave full approval to the
practice of plea bargaining for the first time, concluding that it is "inherent in the criminal
law and its administration." Brady, 397 U.S. at 751.
App. Ct. 1982).
7. People v. Fearing, 442 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ill.
8. People v. Nichols, 493 N.E.2d 677, 680 (fI1. App. Ct. 1986).
9. Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 329. Some early legal literature addressing the phenomenon
did appear. See, e.g., Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Criminal Defendant'sExpress Waiver ofRight to Appeal as PartofNegotiated PleaAgreemen4 89
A.L.R.3d 864 (1979); Gregory M. Dyer & Brendan Judge, Note, Criminal Defendants'
Waiver of the Right to Appeal-An Unacceptable Condition of a Negotiated Sentence or
Plea Bargain,65 NOTRE DAm L. REv. 649 (1990); Edmund F. Schmidt, Note, Criminal
Procedure-PleaBargaining-ImplicitRestrictions on Defendant's Right to Appeal, 21
WAYNE L. REV. 1161 (1975).
10. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 1; People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S2d 140, 141
(App. Div. 1992) (quoting the trial judge in that case as saying, "I normally insist on [an
appeal waiver] on [sic] the price of my plea agreement").
11. Rex Bossert, U.S. Defenders in Battle Over Appeal Waivers, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 1,
1993, at 9 (describing a policy of the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern
District of California requiring appeal waivers in all negotiated misdemeanor cases and a
large percentage of negotiated felony cases) [hereinafter U.S. Defenders]; Spiros A.
Tsimbinos, Conditioning a Plea or Sentence Agreement on a Waiver of Appellate Rights,
N.Y.L. J., Dec. 3, 1990, at 4 ("Prosecutors throughout [New York] State ...have moved to
obtain waiver of appeals in as many cases as possible.").
12. See e.g., People v. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1989) ("Prosecutors
and trial judges can do something about [frivolous criminal appeals] and we encourage
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increased reliance upon appeal waivers as a solution to crowded appellate calendars and what is perceived to be a glut of frivolous criminal appeals. The practice is not without its detractors, however.
Recently, the policy of the United States Attorney for the Northern
District of California of insisting upon appeal waivers in most plea
dispositions resulted in a short-lived, but highly publicized, boycott of
indigent appointments by the local defense bar.'4 Nonetheless, waiver
of the right to appeal is becoming a dominant feature of plea bargaining practice.
This Article explores the legal and constitutional issues raised by
appeal waivers. Section I analyzes the current state of the case law.
Section II explores the due process challenge to appeal waivers, and
concludes that such a challenge would be difficult to sustain given the
current state of due process law. It, nonetheless, goes on to suggest
that a key premise of due process theory as it relates to plea bargaining-the presumed equality of bargaining power between the prosecution and the defense-may be ripe for challenge. Section III discusses
the public policy arguments for and against appeal waivers, and argues
that the public policy debate has been unduly skewed in favor of
caseload concerns, without giving sufficient consideration to the essential role that the right to appeal plays in the criminal justice system.
Section III argues that appeal waivers should either be disapproved or
given very restricted scope. Finally, Section IV explores the particular
problems raised by waivers of sentencing error. It concludes that
waivers of future sentencing error are very difficult to reconcile with
them to do so ....[T]hey should consider obtaining the defendant's waiver of the right to
appeal as part of the negotiated plea.").
13. See, e.g., Roger W. Haines, Jr., Waiver of the Right to Appeal Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED. SENcr. R. 227 (1991). The author, an assistant U.S. Attorney
in San Diego, California, argues that appeal waivers are lawful and that they represent a
"proper and sensible" way of responding to the vastly increased criminal appellate workload that federal courts have experienced in the wake of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. Id. at 227.
14. Bossert, U.S. Defenders, supra note 11, at 1, 10; Rex Bossert, Conflict Panel Withdraws in Appeal Dispute, L.A. DAILY J.,
Mar. 4, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Conflict]; Howard
Mintz, Northern District May Face a Plea Bargain Showdown, Ti RECORDER, Mar. 4,
1993, at 1. The dispute centered around a bank robbery case, United States v. Foster, No.
92-0625DLJ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1993). Bossert, Conflic supra, at 10. In Foster, the defendant negotiated a plea which did not resolve whether or not the defendant was a career
offender-a sentencing issue which, if resolved against the defendant, could have more
than doubled his sentence. Id.The U.S. Attorney insisted upon a waiver of the right to
appeal any sentencing error as a condition of the plea bargain. Bossert, U.S. Defenders,
supra note 11, at 9. The Federal Public Defender assigned to the case resigned in protest.
Id.at 1. Forty-two private attorneys subsequently refused appointment in the case. Bossert, Conflict, supra, at 10.
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traditional definitions of knowing waiver or with the basic policies
which inform the right to appeal. This section urges that even if appeal waivers are upheld generally, such approval should not extend to
waivers of prospective sentencing error.
I.
A.

Current State of the Law on Appeal Waivers

Issues Which can be Raised on Appeal After a Guilty Plea
Absent an Appeal Waiver

A preliminary question to ask is why we are discussing appeal
rights at all, given that the defendant has pleaded guilty. A counseled
guilty plea, that is both voluntary and intelligent, is an admission of
factual guilt that has been traditionally viewed as removing that issue
from the case.' In fact, in a series of United States Supreme Court
cases beginning with the Brady trilogy,16 and culminating in Tollett v.
Henderson,'7 the Court has held that, by entering a plea of guilty, a

defendant forfeits a broad range of potential legal and constitutional
appellate claims that would otherwise have been available had the
case gone to trial. As the Court said in Tollett, "[w]hen a criminal
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty
of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights
that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea."'"
What issues then may a defendant raise on appeal after a guilty
plea; or, to cast the question in the terms of this Article, what appellate remedies are still available to a defendant, after a guilty plea, that
15. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975).
16. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
17. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
18. Id. at 267. Note that the Tollett line of cases does not itself rest on a principle of
waiver. See, e.g., Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983) ("[T]he conclusion that a
Fourth Amendment claim ordinarily may not be raised in a habeas proceeding following a
plea of guilty does not rest on any notion of waiver, but rests on the simple fact that the
claim is irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the conviction."). Indeed, any attempt to
reconcile Tollett with the traditional definition of waiver set out in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege"), seems doomed to failure. See Michael E. igar, The Supreme Court, 1969
Term, Foreword. Waiver of ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the Citadel,84 HARv.L. REv.
1, 8 (1970). For this reason, this article will refer to the operative effect of Tollett and its
progeny as the "forfeiture" of appeal rights. If a defendant has appeal rights that have not
been automatically forfeited by his or her guilty plea per Tollett, then we face the specific
issue addressed by this article: whether these remaining rights may be waived in return for
some consideration as part of a plea bargain.
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could be the subject of waiver? There appear to be roughly five broad
categories of such claims.

First, there are potential issues arising from the entry of the guilty
plea itself-whether, for example, the plea was knowing and voluntary and whether defendant received adequate assistance of counsel in
entering the plea. Tollett makes clear that these issues survive a plea
of guilty. 19 Quite simply, reliance on the plea to foreclose appellate
review cannot be countenanced if the plea itself is invalid. Thus, it
must always be open to the defendant to show that the plea was defective. As will be shown below, a number of courts have held that this
first category of issues also survives an appeal waiver.20
Second, despite the broad language of McMann v. Richardson2 '
and Tollett, the Court has made clear that there are certain constitutional claims that survive a guilty plea even though the alleged error
took place prior to the entry of the plea. Such issues are typified by
the due process claim considered in Blackledge v. Perry,' which the
Court found to be so fundamental that it "went to the very power of
the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge
brought against him." 23 These claims include constitutional issues
such as the double jeopardy claim in Menna v. New YorkA which the
Court found to survive a plea of guilty because it was "not logically
inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt." Legal
scholars have vigorously debated the meaning and exact contours of
these exceptions to the Tollett rule. 26 For the purposes of this Article,
19. 411 U.S. at 267. Cf McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
20. See, eg., United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1993); State v. Gibson,
348 A.2d 769, 774 (N.J. 1975); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (N.Y. 1989).
21. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
22. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). In Blackledge, the defendant was charged with a more serious
offense after exercising his right to trial de novo under a state statute. The Court held that
the potential for vindictiveness in such a situation was so great as to violate due process
and that this due process claim could be raised on appeal even though the accused had
pleaded guilty to the more serious charge. Id. at 28-29.
23. Ia at 30.
24. 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
25. Id at 63 n.2.
26. Note, for example, the exchange between Professors Westen and Saltzburg: Peter
Westen, Away From Waiver. A Rationalefor the Forfeitureof ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Procedure,75 MIcH.L. Rnv. 1214 (1977); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and
the Loss of ConstitutionalRights: The CurrentPrice of PleadingGuilty, 76 MicH.L. REv.
1265 (1978); Peter Westen, Forfeiture by Guilty Plea-A Reply, 76 MicH.L. REv. 1308
(1978). See Tigar, supra note 18; Robert N. Shwartz, Note, The Guilty Pleaas a Waiver of
"Presentbut Unknowable" ConstitutionalRights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74
COLUM. L. Rav. 1435 (1974). See also Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The De-
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however, it is sufficient to acknowledge that such exceptions exist, and
consequently provide defendants with appellate rights as to certain
antecedent constitutional violations, which can, in turn, become the
subject of plea bargains for their waiver.
Third, there are specific issues that can be raised on appeal after a
plea in those states which have created statutory exceptions to the
Tollett rule. For example, in California and New York, a defendant
may raise suppression issues on appeal, notwithstanding the fact that
the judgment is predicated upon a plea of guilty. 27 The Supreme
Court has, in turn, determined that states are free to carve out such
legislative exceptions to the Tollett rule, and that when they do, the
defendant may have access to federal habeas corpus as well as the
direct appeal, in spite of a guilty plea.2
Where such appeal rights are granted by statute, they often account for a significant percentage of appeals arising in that state. For
example, a recent study by the National Center for State Courts found
that appeals from guilty pleas and other nontrial dispositions averaged
between 14% and 25% of all appeals in states which do not provide an
exception to the Tollett rule.2 9 In contrast, appeals from nontrial dispositions in certain California and New York appellate districts
amounted to 43% of the total dispositions for each state.3" Both New
York and California courts have ruled that these statutorily granted
appeal rights may be the subject of bargained-for waiver. 31 These rulings are among the more significant of the appeal waiver cases because of the number of potential cases affected.
Yet another category of potential appeal waiver cases includes
those in which an appeal waiver is taken in the absence of an actual
guilty plea. Two examples are illustrative: in the first, the defendant is
convicted at trial and then conducts sentence bargaining which includes an appeal waiver; 32 in the second, the defendant has two cases
fense Attorney, and The Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter The
Supreme Court]; George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure:A Brieffor More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEx. L. REv. 193 (1977).

27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (West 1993); N.Y. ClM. PROc. LAW § 710.20(1)
(McKinney 1995).
28. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 291-93 (1975).
29. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL APPEALS 31, 44 n.8 (1989) [hereinafter NCSC].
30. Id.
31. People v. Williams, 331 N.E.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. 1975); People v. Charles, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 402, 409 (Ct. App. 1985).
32. See e.g., Bunnell v. Superior Ct., 531 P.2d 1086, 1093 (Cal. 1975); Cubbage v.
State, 498 A.2d 632,633 (Md. 1985); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (N.Y. 1989).
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pending and gets convicted after trial in one while plea bargaining in
the other for a combined sentence disposition.33 In both situations
there has been no guilty plea in the case in which the defendant wishes
to raise appellate issues. Thus, those issues survive the forfeiture rules
of Tollett and are available on appeal unless the defendant specifically
waives them. 4
The last category is by far the most significant and involves the
vast array of sentencing issues that may potentially be the subject of
postplea appeals. It is a procedural fact of life that if there is sentencing error, it will follow, rather than precede, the plea. Therefore, the
forfeiture rule of the Tollett line of cases will not operate to preclude
appeals in cases involving sentencing error. Perhaps of equal importance, the range of potential sentencing issues has increased exponentially in recent years with the advent of complex determinate
sentencing schemes that have been adopted in the federal system 35 as
well as in many states.36
The appeal of sentencing issues thus represents a "growing
trend." 37 A recent study found that
Sentencing issues were raised in one quarter of the appeals [that
were the subject of this study], and it appears that sentencing
issues are not simply 'add-on' issues to appeals that would
otherwise have been filed; a great number of appeals were ified
raising only sentencing issues. In addition, sentencing issues
have a high error rate. In fact, when sentencing is raised, the
appellate court finds error 25 percent of the time.3"
See also People v. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (Ct. App. 1993). Nguyen was submitted on
the preliminary hearing transcript. Although tantamount to a plea, such a "slow plea"
does not come within the forfeiture rules of Tollett. Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 291.
33. See, e.g., People v. Nichols, 493 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); People v.
Fearing, 442 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982).
34. It has been argued that it is particularly unfair to uphold appeal waivers in this
class of cases because the defendant has maintained his innocence throughout in the disGibson, 348 A.2d at
puted case. This argument has received a mixed reception. See, e.g.,
775-76 (holding that "a defendant who has never admitted his guilt should, as we view the
interests of justice and appropriate policy considerations, not be deemed to have irrevocably waived his right of direct appeal from a conviction unless he fails to file an appeal
within the time provided therefore by law"); Seaberg,541 N.E.2d at 1026 (finding "no basis
for distinguishing" the guilty plea situation from the one where defendant has steadfastly
maintained his innocence).
35. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1988), 28 U.S.C. §§ 99198 (1988).
36. See, e.g., CAL.PneAL CODE §§ 1168-1170.6 (West 1985); ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 38,
paras. 1005-8-1 to 1005-8-4 (Smith-Hurd 1981); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-1-1 to 35-50-6-6
(Bums 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)-(3), 70.02, 70.06, 220.00-43 (McKinney 1987).
37. NCSC, supra note 29, at 8.
38. Itt at 8.
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Given the confluence of these three factors-the immunity of
sentencing issues from the Tollett forfeiture rules, the wide range of
potential sentencing issues, and the relatively high rate of success
these claims meet on appeal-it is perhaps not surprising that the
pressure to waive appellate rights is most intense in the area of sentencing appeals, or that a high percentage of the recent reported cases
have included the issue of appeal waivers. 39
B.

Current Case Law on Appeal Waivers

There has been a sharp increase in reported cases dealing with
appeal waivers over the past several years at both the state and federal levels. The cases range from broad challenges to appeal waivers,
to specific procedural and interpretive challenges, and can be grouped
in the following categories.
1. Per Se Challenges
A substantial majority of state40 and federal4 1 courts which have

considered appeal waivers have upheld them against broad per se
challenges. Some of these courts have upheld such waivers without
the benefit of any real supporting analysis.42 Others have limited their
inquiry simply to whether the waiver was free and voluntary, and did
not examine the more basic question of whether such waivers should
be permitted at all. 4 Most, however, have examined the underlying
39. See, e.g., United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 942 (1992); People v.
Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (Ct. App. 1993); Ballweber v. State, 457 N.W.2d 215 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990); People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1992).
40. Gwin v. State, 456 So. 2d 845 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); People v. Charles, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1985); Staton v. Warden, 398 A.2d 1176 (Conn. 1978); People v. Fearing, 442 N.E.2d 939 (Il. App. Ct. 1982); Weatherford v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 882
(Ky. 1986); Cubbage v. State, 498 A.2d 632 (Md. 1985); State v. Gallant, 574 A.2d 385
(N.H. 1990); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1989); White v. State, 833 S.W.2d
339 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Perkins, 737 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1987); Blackburn v. State,
290 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 1982). Cf. Karnezis, supra note 9.
41. Appeal waivers have been upheld in all but one of the federal circuits which have
considered them: United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. NavarroBotello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 942 (1992); Johnson v. United
States, 838 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1988). Compare Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713,
718 (1st Cir. 1966) (disapproving of appeal waivers in dicta because they "put a price on an
appeal").
42. See e.g., Rivera, 971 F.2d at 896.
43. Gwin, 456 So. 2d at 847; People v. Williams, 331 N.E.2d 684, 684 (N.Y. 1975). See
also State v. McKinney, 406 So. 2d 160, 162 (La. 1981) ("extensive 'boykinization' assures
that waiver is free and voluntary). The latter reference is to the procedural requirements
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public policy issues with at least some care before coming to the conclusion that appeal waivers pass constitutional muster.44
A common line of reasoning in cases upholding appeal waivers
begins with the observation that "nearly every right, constitutional or
statutory, may be waived. ' 45 Judicial approval of plea bargaining in
general is necessarily predicated upon a determination that the constitutional right to jury trial may be waived in exchange for inducements
such as a reduction in the charge or sentence. 46 Since the fight to
appeal is generally not regarded to be of constitutional dimension,47
of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), for ensuring that a guilty plea is knowing and
voluntary.
44. However, many of these same courts fall out in considerable disarray over more
specific application questions, such as whether certain issues should be beyond the reach of
appeal waivers, see infra text accompanying notes 93-101; what will render a waiver unknowing or involuntary, see infra text accompanying notes 70-71; and what procedural requirements should attend the taking of such waivers, see infra text accompanying notes
102-113, to name a few.
45. Cubbage,498 A.2d at 634. This concept that most rights are subject to waiver finds
frequent articulation throughout the case law. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 115
S. Ct. 797, 801 (1995); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935 n.12 (1991). For example,
it has been held that a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive: the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Boykin,
395 U.S. at 243; the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819 (1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938); the Sixth Amendment rights to
jury trial and confrontation, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, and the statutory right to pursue civil
rights claims against government officials, Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 39298 (1987).
46. Brady, 397 U.S. at 753 ("[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State
to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State...
by his plea. .. ").
47. Over a century ago, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held that the right
to appeal was not "a necessary element of due process of law." McKane v. Durston, 153
U.S. 684, 687 (1894). Although a majority of the Court has continued to hew at that line,
see, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), some justices have, in recent years, challenged that accepted wisdom. Id. at 756 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If the question
were to come before us in a proper case, I have little doubt... that we would decide that a
State must afford at least some opportunity for review of convictions ... ."). Moreover, a
spate of recent legal literature has developed, calling for a rethinking of this question. See
Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the ConstitutionalRight to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 503 (1992); Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95
YALE L.J. 62 (1985); Harry G. Fins, Is the Right of Appeal Protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment? 54 JuDicArtRE 296 (1971); Judith Resnik, PrecludingAppeals, 70 CoRumtmL
L. RFv. 603 (1985); David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in
American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518 (1990); Alex S. Ellerson,
Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 CoLUm. L. Rnv. 373
(1991). This past term, the Court issued an opinion which suggests the issue may, in fact,
be ripe for reconsideration. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331 (1994), the
Court held that, at least in certain civil contexts, the right to judicial review is compelled by
the due process guarantee. Id. at 2334. This opinion, as well as the larger question of
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most courts reason that "if defendants can waive fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to counsel, or the right to jury trial,
surely they are not precluded from waiving procedural rights granted
by statute."'4 One commentator has observed that "[t]he reasoning of
those courts which invalidate pleas conditioned on defendant's agreement to waive his right to appeal seems curiously at odds with the
theoretical underpinnings of the plea bargaining
widely-accepted
9
system.

4

The other major thread of reasoning running through the cases
upholding appeal waivers is a sweeping public policy analysis which
points to a broad array of perceived benefits that flow from the inclusion of such waivers more or less equally to both the state and the
accused.50 The benefits to the state are described variously as some
combination of finality, 5 economy 52 and the prompt settlement of litiwhether the right to appeal in criminal cases might have constitutional stature, is explored
further, infra, in the text accompanying notes 209-224. Although all 50 states provide appellate review in some form, Arkin, supra, at 513-14, only a few grant the right as a matter
of constitutional prerogative. Even in those states, courts have found that the right may be
waived like other constitutional rights. Fearing,442 N.E. 2d at 941; Perkins, 737 P.2d at
251.
48. Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 53 (quoting United States v. Clark, 865 F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th
Cir. 1989)). Similar language may be found in United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566,
567 (5th Cir. 1992); Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321; People v. Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d
445, 448 (Ct. App. 1993); Charles,217 Cal. Rptr. at 405; Gibson, 348 A.2d at 777 (Schreiber, J., concurring) and Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1024, to name a few.
49. JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 5.14,5-29 (2d ed. 1983).
50. United States v. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d 1037, 1040; Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 405
(Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). Cf. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTic Standard 212.2(c) cmt., (1980) (urging that appeal waivers are beneficial to all parties and are, therefore, "entirely proper").
51. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829 ("Waivers of appeal in plea agreements preserve the finality
of judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to valid pleas of guilty."); Navarro-Botello,
912 F.2d at 322 ("The most important benefit of plea bargaining is the finality that
results.").
52. At the heart of this argument is frequently a perception that the system is
overburdened with criminal appeals, most of which are frivolous. See, e.g., Olson, 264 Cal.
Rptr. at 819. This perception and its factual bases are addressed in greater detail, infra, in
the text accompanying notes 337-422. Many courts are quite frank about the cost-savings
aspect of plea bargaining in general and appeal waivers in particular. See, e.g., NavarroBotello, 912 F.2d at 322 ("plea bargaining saves the state time and money"); Gonzalez, 981
F.2d at 1040 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("The assurance that the plea won't be set aside on
appeal enables the prosecutor to cut short the time and other resources she will devote to
the case."). This viewpoint received perhaps its most unvarnished articulation in Seaberg,
where the court opined that "if full trials were required in each case New York's law enforcement system would collapse." 541 N.E.2d at 1024. Whether a similar observation
might be made about the dangers inherent in full utilization of defendant's appeal rights,
one California court attempted to compute the costs of the average "criminal appeal with
no meritorious issues" at approximately $6,000 and extrapolated from this figure that "if
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gation.5 3 The major benefit to the defendant is viewed as an increase
in plea bargaining leverage which provides the accused with another
important bargaining chip to bring to the plea negotiation table.54
This observation is sometimes coupled with the warning that contrary
rulings would cut down on incentives for prosecutors to offer inducements in general.5 5 In addition, defendants are also perceived as benefiting in much the same way as the government benefits from the
certainty that such a process promises. 6
While the majority of courts considering the matter have upheld
appeal waivers, a minority of jurisdictions have refused to uphold
them in any form. Two separate lines of reasoning recur in these
cases: first, that the use of such waivers impermissibly chills the right
to appeal in violation of due process, 7 and second, that such waivers
violate public policy. The public policy rationale most frequently articulated is the need to prevent the parties in the criminal process

only five percent of these appeals fall into the 'frivolous' category those 285 cases result in
an unnecessary cost to the taxpayers of $1,710,000 a year." Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
53. See Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1024 ("[B]argains fairly made should signal an end to
litigation, not a beginning .... "). Cf.Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775 ("We do not share the view
that there is an affirmative public policy to be served in fostering appeals .... 'The settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy."' (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 168
A.2d 72, 74 (N.J. 1961), cert. denied, 171 A.2d 147 (N.J. 1961)).
54. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1043 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Criminal defendants usually
have few enough bargaining chips; sparing the government the time and expense of a trial
and appeal is the primary currency in which they must deal."). Cf. Gibson, 348 A.2d at
775.
55. People v. Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) ("It stands to
reason that a party to agreements voluntarily entered into, but consistently repudiated by
means of appeal, might become wary of entering into such agreements."). Cf.Gibson, 348
A.2d at 775; Perkins, 737 P.2d at 251.
56. See, e.g., Navarro-Botello,912 F.2d at 320 ("Whatever appellate issues might have
been available to Navarro-Botello were speculative compared to the certainty derived
from the negotiated plea with a set sentence parameter.").
57. The most frequently cited case for this proposition is People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d
325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972), where the court invalidated an implicit appeal waiver because
of its "chilling effect on the right to appeal." ld at 330. An implicit appeal waiver is a
bargain that indirectly achieves a waiver of appeal rights, by means of a stipulation that
one charge will be dismissed only after the appeal period had expired on the disputed
charge. Butler, in turn, relied upon dicta in People v. Harrison, 191 N.W.2d 371 (Mich.
1971), and Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966), which strongly condemned the practice as "constitutionally obnoxious," Harrison, 191 N.W.2d at 374, and
"unfair," Worcester, 370 F.2d at 718. Butler also relied upon People v. Ramos, 292
N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1968), which found the practice to be "tantamount to a denial of
defendant's right to appeal." Id. at 940. (Ranos was overruled, sub silentio, by Seaberg,
541 N.E.2d at 1022.)
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from insulating themselves from all review,58 although sometimes the
matter is merely asserted without the benefit of any real analysis.59
Those jurisdictions which have invalidated appeal waivers differ
dramatically on the remedy they will provide. Some simply allow the
appeal to go forward,60 others void the conviction,6 1 while still others

allow the appeal to proceed but give the prosecutor the option of
voiding the plea bargain. 62
Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on
63
this issue directly, the Court's opinion in United States v. Mezzanatto
strongly suggests that the current Court would approve present appeal
waiver practice if the matter were to come before itf'
Prior to Mezzanatto, Town of Newton v. Rumery65 was frequently
cited as bestowing the High Court's official blessing upon negotiated
appeal waivers. However, that case is of questionable precedential
value because Rumery was concerned with release dismissal agreements 66 and the Court distinguished that type of arrangement from
traditional plea bargains. 67 More importantly, Justice O'Connor's
critical concurring vote was premised on a requirement that the government would bear the burden of proving that such release agreements were "voluntarily made, not the product of prosecutorial
overreaching, and in the public interest. ' 68 Her concurrence emphasized the need for actual proof on this issue and cautioned against
presuming validity in any given case.69 If the Court were to impose
similar proof requirements on the government in every case in which
58. State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768, 769 (Ariz. 1979). Cf.Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 330.
The continuing authority of Butleris called into some question by an opinion from a different panel of the same Michigan court of appeal which examines each of the separate bases
underlying the Butler opinion and rejects them as "at odds with the widely accepted underpinnings of the plea bargaining system." Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 291.
59. See, e.g., Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
60. See, e.g., id. at 1068.
61. See, e.g., Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 325.
62. See, e.g., Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775.
63. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995) (approving the prosecutorial practice of soliciting waivers of
the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(e)(6) as a condition of plea bargaining). The implications of the Mezzanatto opinion
are discussed in greater detail, infra, in the text accompanying notes 218-224.
64. Id at 802.
65. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
66. These are agreements in which a criminal defendant releases his right to file an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in return for a prosecutor's dismissal of pending criminal
charges.
67. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 393 n.3.
68. Id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
concurring).
69. Id. at 401-02 (O'Connor, J.,
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it wished to rely upon a waiver of appeal rights, those waivers would
lose much of their docket clearing magic.
2. Challenges to the Voluntariness of the Waiver and to Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Advising as to the Plea
Virtually all courts agree that despite an appeal waiver, defendants remain free to raise on appeal any issue which goes to the validity
of the plea or the waiver itself. For example, there is general agreement that a defendant will not be precluded from appealing issues
pertaining to the knowing and voluntary character of the plea or appeal waiver.70 Thus, in United States v. Baty, where the defendant
asked the court to explain a written plea agreement which set forth
the appeal waiver and, where the trial court declined to do so, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. 1 In contrast, where the record has revealed full disclosure and
an eyes-open decision by the defendant, courts usually have no problem upholding the voluntariness of the waiver.72
As a corollary, there appears to be general consensus that an accused may raise the question of adequate assistance of counsel in
making the waiver. One case directly holds that such a claim can be
raised as a basis for setting aside the waiver, thereby rejecting the argument that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can only be
raised in a collateral proceeding.7 3 Several other cases suggest in dicta
that such claims may be made, but theorize that they are more appropriately brought as part of a collateral attack. For example, United
States v. Abarcava holds that an appeal waiver also operates as a
waiver of rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.75 Thus, this holding supports the general
principle that ineffective assistance issues are not waived, but is silent
on whether they could be used to challenge the waiver on appeal.
70. See, eg., United States v. Baty, 980 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1992); People v. Vargas,
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 445, 449 (Ct. App. 1993). Currently, a controversy surrounds the question
of whether prospective waiver of future, unknown sentencing error can ever be viewed as
an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Rutan and Navarro-Botellohold that it can. Vargas and
People v. Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (Ct. App. 1993), hold that it cannot. This issue is
discussed in detail, infra, in Section IV.
71. 980 F.2d at 978-79.
72. See, eg., Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 53; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 318.
73. See, eg., United States v. Craig, 985 F2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1993).
74. 985 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1993).
75. Id.at 1014.
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Judge Kozinski, in his United States v. Gonzalez76 dissent, indicated
that ineffective assistance challenges may be made but must be limited
to section 2255 motions.77 Finally, the district court in United States v.
Kuh178 provided a particularly confusing message. In a case where it
was clear that both the prosecution and defense counsel had erred in
calculating the correct sentencing guideline range,7 9 the court held
that defendant's appeal waiver also constituted a waiver of any collateral attack under section 2255.80 What is confusing about this holding
is that the court repeated the received wisdom that ineffective assistance of counsel can be challenged on collateral attack, but then ignored the fact that defendant's claim was largely based on ineffective
assistance grounds when it dismissed defendant's section 2255 claim.8 '
3. Challenges that the Sentence Imposed was in Violation of the Plea
Bargain
Another category of appeals which are traditionally permitted,
despite a general waiver of appeal rights, include issues of whether
there has been compliance with the bargain. Since much of the reasoning supporting appeal waivers is grounded in notions of contract
law,82 there is wide agreement that "the defendant always retains the
right to complain that the sentence was in excess of the bargain ....
Otherwise, a deprivation of that bargain might arise, for which the
waiver of appeal was presumably part of the quid pro quo. '83 Failure
to comply with the terms of the bargain has alternatively been viewed
by at least one federal court as undermining the voluntariness of the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

981 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id.at 1043 (Kozinsky, J.,
dissenting).
816 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
ld.at 626.
IM at 628.

81. Md at 628-30.
82. See, e.g., Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493. See also Gibson, 348 A.2d at 784-85
(Pashman, J., dissenting); People v. Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526,532 (App. Div. 1988). Ventura is discussed, infra, in note 325. Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)
("[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled."); United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993). Contra People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791 (N.Y. 1974) ("Application to plea negotiations of contract law is incongruous. The strong public policy of rehabilitating offenders, protecting
society, and deterring other potential offenders presents considerations paramount to benefits beyond the power of individuals to 'contract."').
83. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494. Cf. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1038. But see id at
1042 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting) (arguing that such claims should only be heard if the failure

to comply has first been challenged in the trial court by way of motion or objection);
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320.
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plea, with the court coming to the same conclusion
on appealability as
4
those courts which rely on contract principles.8
4. Invalidity of Waivers Involving Nonsentencing Issues

Some states have upheld appeal waivers in general, but have
found waivers involving certain enumerated rights to be invalid. For
example, in New York an accused may not waive speedy trial claims, 5
or claims that challenge the legality of a sentence or the defendant's
competency to stand trial.86 The rationale behind these rulings is that
those legal protections have to do, not only with the fairness to the
accused, but also with the "fairness in the process itself and, therefore,
a defendant may not waive them." 87 At least one State Bar has determined that it would be unethical for either the defense attorney or the
prosecutor to negotiate a waiver of allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel or of prosecutorial misconduct. 88
5. Appeals Challenging the Sentence Imposed
As noted earlier, courts generally permit challenges alleging that
the sentence imposed was in violation of the plea bargain.89 However,
the issue which has led to the greatest division is whether other sentencing error may be waived as part of a waiver of appeal rights.
Roughly five different approaches can be gleaned from these cases.
Minnesota has gone the farthest by holding that all sentencing
error is immune from negotiated appeal waivers. 90 A Minnesota appellate court has concluded that the combination of an unconditional
statutory right to appeal all sentencing error plus the statutorily de84. Salcido-Contreras,990 F.2d at 52.
85. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025.
86. People v. Callahan, 604 N.E.2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1992) (citing People v. Armlin, 371
N.Y.S.2d 691).
87. Seaberg,541 N.E.2d at 1025. This principle that there are some rights which implicate the very fairness of the system and which therefore cannot be waived is encountered
in many jurisdictions. See, eg., CAL. Crv. CODE § 3513 (West 1988) ("Anyone may waive
the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public
reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement."). However, such provisions are
normally interpreted quite narrowly. In fact, section § 3513 has been read as creating a
presumption in favor of waiver in the normal case. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior
Ct., 124 Cal. Rptr. 852, 859 (Ct. App. 1975) ("Unless otherwise provided by law, any person may waive the advantage of a law intended for his benefit (CiV. CODE § 3513).").
88. THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Canon
VI, 129 (Michie 1993).
89. See supra Section l(B)(3).
90. Ballweber v. State, 457 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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fined role of the courts under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 91
requires a determination that normal theories of waiver should not
apply to sentencing error: "'Vindication of the Guidelines' stated
goals of establishing 'rational and consistent sentencing standards' of
reducing sentencing disparity, and providing uniformity in sentencing
requires appellate review of trial court sentencing decisions."'
A number of jurisdictions, including New York, 93 California, 94

and some federal courts, 95 hold that claims of illegal sentencing may
be raised despite an appeal waiver. To reach this conclusion, these
courts have employed a rather narrow definition of an illegal
96

sentence.

Most federal courts take the very expansive position that all sentencing error, except for illegal sentences, may be waived despite the
fact that the nature and dimensions of the possible error were un97
known to the defendant at the time of the plea and appeal wavier.
These cases have explicitly rejected the contention that, consistent
98
with Johnson v. Zerbst, a defendant cannot waive an unknown right.
By way of contrast, California courts have taken virtually the opposite
position, holding that defendants cannot waive unknown, prospective
sentencing error, at least without an explicit statement that this is being waived. 99

Lastly, a number of state courts, including those in California
which would otherwise not allow waiver of future sentencing error,
91. Mn'Nm. STAT. ANN. § 244 (West 1995).

92. Ballweber, 457 N.W.2d at 217. It is interesting to note the similarity between the
content and goals of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines. See

UNITED STATES COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-

(1992). The text accompanying notes 271-289, infra, explores whether the policies
underlying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines require a conclusion similar to that of the
Ballweber opinion regarding appellate review of sentencing error. 457 N.W.2d at 217-18.
At least one California court has opined in dicta that sentencing error cannot be waived.
Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819 n.2. However, at least three other California cases hold to the
contrary. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494; Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446; People v. Brown,
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 353 (Ct. App. 1994).
93. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025.
94. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494 (holding that acts beyond the court's jurisdiction
cannot be waived).
95. See, eg., Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829.
96. Callahanis careful to distinguish between challenges that go to the legality of the
sentence or the power of the court to impose sentence and claims which are "addressed
merely to the adequacy of the procedures the court used to arrive at its sentencing determination." 604 N.E. at 112. The latter are waiveable; the former are not.
97. See, e.g., Rutan, 956 F.2d at 830; Melancon, 972 F.2d at 572; Navarro-Botello, 912
F.2d at 320.
98. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 830; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320.
99. Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451; Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-26.
UAL
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will uphold sentencing appeal waivers when the bargain includes an
agreement between the parties for a specific sentence. 00 In these
cases, the courts reason that the defendant cannot complain
when he
101
has received precisely that for which he has bargained.
6. Requirement that the Trial Judge Specifically Address the Defendant
Concerning Waiver of Appeal Rights
A current area of specific controversy in federal courts concerns
whether the trial judge must personally address the accused about any
appeal waiver as part of the court's obligation under Rule 11.102 In
United States v. Wessells, 10 3 the Fourth Circuit held that a written appeal waiver would not operate to prevent the accused from appealing
an improper application of the sentencing guidelines where "the transcript of Wessells' Rule 11 hearing before the district court reveals
that the court did not question Wessells specifically concerning the
waiver provision of the plea agreement,"'1 4 and where other evidence
indicated defendant's waiver was not knowing and voluntary. 0 5 On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. DeSantiago-Marti100. See, eg., Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494-95.
101. See, eg., People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (App. Div. 1992).
102. Rule 11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires, in part, that "the
Court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the
result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement." FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(d).
Incidental to the Rule 11 controversy is a dispute over whether an appeal waiver can
be viewed as free and voluntary when the trial court fails to comply with the requirement
of Federal Rule 32(c)(5) that it advise the defendant of the right to appeal his sentence.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(5). Actually, this issue has arisen with both a positive and a negative spin-with courts having to consider alternatively whether compliance or noncompliance with the Rule could undermine the voluntary quality of an appeal waiver. Both
contentions have been rejected. The argument that compliance with the Rule could invalidate a waiver is premised on the reasoning that a defendant cannot make a knowing waiver
of a right the court tells him he still retains. The Fifth Circuit rejected such an argument in
Melancon, relying on the fact that the court's statement came nearly four months after the
plea agreement, and could not have influenced the defendant's decision to plead. 972 F.2d
at 568. Similar problems could be avoided in the future simply by not only complying with
the notice provision of Rule 32, but by going on to explain that this is what is being waived.
In United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 980 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit
rejected the reverse argument, declining to adopt defendant's contention that, in order to
make the waiver of the right to appeal a knowing one, the court was required to comply
with the Rule 32 mandate that the accused be informed that he had such a right in the first
place. Id at 583.
103. 936 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991).
104. Id. at 168.
105. Id.
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nez' 6 explicitly held that "a Rule 11 colloquy on the waiver of the
right to appeal is not a prerequisite to a finding that the waiver is
valid. ' 10 7 The dissenting opinion objected that the majority was permitting "the district court to shirk its duties under Rule 11 and Rule
of the right to appeal a sentence is
32(a)(2) when a defendant's waiver
'08
contained in a plea agreement.'
This issue is not limited to the federal courts. Recently, in People
v. Castrillon,0 9 a California appellate court held that a properly executed written waiver form may be relied upon as a sufficient showing
of a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to appeal. 10 This issue
is not new to guilty plea practice. Over a decade ago, the California
Supreme Court held that reliance upon a written waiver form was sufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate of Boykin v. Alabama,"'
while the United States Supreme Court has urged that in these sorts
of inquiries, 112"[m]atters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be
controlling."

On a related front, another California appellate court has recently held that a waiver of appeal rights, which does not include a
specific advisement to the accused of the existence of such appeal
rights, is3 not a knowing and intelligent waiver and is therefore
11
invalid.
7. Appeals by the Government
At least one federal court has interpreted such appeal waivers by
the defendant as necessarily containing an implicit mutuality provision
which would bar appeals by the government as well." 4 Despite the
fact that the plea agreement in that case applied on its face only to
prevent appeals by the defendant, the Fourth Circuit dismissed a sentencing appeal by the government on the grounds that it would be "far
too one-sided to construe the plea agreement to permit an appeal by
106. 980 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1992).

107. Id. at 583.
108. I& (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
109. 278 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Ct. App. 1991).

110. Id. at 123.
111. 395 U.S. 238 (1969), cited in, In re Ibarra, 666 P.2d 980, 984-85 (Cal. 1983).

112. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 n.20 (1969) (citing Kennedy v.
United States, 397 F.2d 16, 17 (6th Cir. 1968)). See also infra text accompanying note 441.
113. People v. Rosso, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 221 (Ct. App. 1994).
114. United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299,1299 (4th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S.

977 (1992).
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the government... but not to permit an appeal on similar grounds by
5
the defendant.""
H. The Due Process Issue
The early cases which struck down appeal waivers often did so on
due process grounds. 116 This rationale was derived from a series of
United States Supreme Court cases that began with Griffin v. Illinois" 7 and continued with Rinaldi20 v. Yeager,1"' North Carolina v.
Pearce,119 and Blackledge v. Perry.'
Griffin and its progeny invalidated a variety of different state
practices, all of which were viewed as violating due process because
they placed an impermissible burden on the right of a defendant to
appeal a criminal conviction.' 2 ' As formulated in Pearce, a central
tenet of due process doctrine as it pertains to appeals is that "[a] court
is 'without right to... put a price on an appeal. A defendant's
exer'122
cise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered."
A. Do Appeal Waivers Impermissibly "Chill" the Right to Appeal?
It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of lower courts in the
early 1970s found bargained-for appeal waivers to violate due process. 23 It would certainly seem that such waivers result in a price be115. Id.at 1299. One commentator has criticized the Fourth Circuit's attempt in
Guevara to rewrite the plea agreement and has suggested an alternative solution wherein
"neither party should be barred from an appeal unless both have explicitly waived that
right." D. Randall Johnson, Giving Trial Judges the Final Word: Waiving the Right to Appeal Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act, 71 NEB. L. REv. 694,724 (1992).
116. See supra note 57.
117. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding due process requires indigent defendants receive a free
trial transcript for appeals).
118. 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (invalidating a state statute that required only defendants sentenced to prison to reimburse the state for the costs of their trial transcripts).
119. 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (invalidating the practice of vindictively imposing greater
sentences on retrial following a successful appeal).
120. 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (invalidating a practice of bringing more serious charges whenever a defendant exercised a statutory right of trial de novo as a means of "appealing" a
misdemeanor conviction).
121. Id at 28-29.
122. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting Worcester, 370 F.2d at 718).
123. As recently as 1990, a law review note contended that the Griffin line of cases
compelled such a conclusion. Dyer & Judge, supra note 9, at 669. Cf.Paul D. Borman,
The Chilled Right to Appeal from a Plea Bargain Conviction:A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw.
U. L. REv. 663 (1974); Schmidt, supra note 9, at 675.
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ing placed on the right to appeal. 24 If one defendant gets less time in
exchange for waiving the right to appeal, then the defendant who insists upon exercising the right must inevitably get more, and that
amount "more" is the price of an appeal.
Such reasoning has, of course, been challenged. Judge Bazelon,
in his now famous opinion addressing a similar argument with respect
to plea bargaining at trial, was of the belief that:
Superficially it may seem that .. .the defendant who insists
upon a trial [and] is found guilty pays a price for the exercise of
his right when he receives a longer sentence than his less venturesome counterpart who pleads guilty. In a sense he has. But
the critical distinction is that the price he has paid is not one
imposed by the state to discourage others from a similar exercise of their rights, but rather one encountered by those who
gamble and lose ....To the extent that the bargain struck reflects only the uncertainty of conviction before trial, the "expected sentence before trial"-length of sentence discounted by
probability of conviction-is the same for those who decide to
plead guilty and those
who hope for acquittal but risk conviction
125
by going to trial.
Of course, this is not an argument that there is no price for assertion of the right but rather an argument that the price is a rational one
set by the relevant market. The question remains whether such a
price-rational or otherwise-should exist.
Moreover, the price may not be a rational one. It seems reasonable to assume that the prosecutor is most likely to offer significant
concessions for the waiver of appeal rights when the defendant has
colorable issues on appeal. 126 Why else would the prosecutor offer
concessions of any magnitude for waiver of the right? But if this is
correct, does it remove from the appellate docket those cases we
would most like to see go away? As one commentator has observed
with regard to trial bargaining:
If somehow it were possible to have one purified form of plea
bargaining to the exclusion of another, most observers probably
would prefer the form that eliminated from the trial process the
cases in which trial would serve no apparent purpose rather than
124. The trial judge in People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1992), certainly
understood it that way when he told the defendant, "I normally insist on [an appeal waiver]
on [sic] the price of my plea agreement." Id. at 141.
125. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
126. Some cases suggest that appeal waivers will occur mostly where "the defendant has
no real interest in an appeal." Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819. However, it is difficult to see
why such a defendant would be offered very much by way of concessions.
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the 12form
that left for trial the cases in which there is nothing to
7
try.

At the appellate level, a rational system would likewise remove from
appellate review those cases which are patently frivolous rather than
those which are viewed as having colorable issues.
Proponents of appeal waivers often counter this argument by asserting that virtually all criminal appeals are frivolous.'28 Such a contention is generally not born out by the statistics. 129 This issue is
explored in detail in the following section.
However, such a discussion must be viewed as more or less academic because even if one were to obtain universal agreement that a
major effect of all appeal waivers is to burden or "chill" the right to
appeal, under current case law this would still not compel a conclusion
that due process has been violated. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has emphatically abandoned the "rights-burdening" reasoning
of the Griffin line of cases. Perhaps the clearest statement of this appears in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,130 where the Court explicitly rejected
the contention that a "chilling effect" upon the right to appeal, in the
absence of proof of vindictiveness on the part of the court or prosecutor, could establish a due process claim. 31 Instead, the Court read
North Carolinav. Pearce as intimating "no doubt about the constitutional validity of higher sentences in the absence of vindictiveness despite whatever incidental deterrent effect they might have on the right
to appeal."'13
Guilty plea cases such as Brady v. United States, 33 Parker v.
North Carolina,'34 and North Carolina v. Alford, 135 where the Court
upheld waivers of the right to jury trial that were entered as part of a
traditional plea bargain in order to avoid potential imposition of the
death penalty, strongly underscore the point that mere discouragement or "chilling" of the exercise of a fundamental right will not be
viewed by the Court as a violation of due process, particularly when it
arises in a plea bargaining context. It is difficult to imagine anything
127. Albert W. Alschuler, The ChangingPlea BargainingDebate,69 CA.. L. REv. 652,
694 (1981).
128. See, eg., Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19.
129. NCSC, supra note 29, at 5.
130. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
131. Id at 29.
132. Id Cf.Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319

(1970).
133. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
134. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).

135. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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more potentially "chilling" upon the free exercise of the right to jury
trial than a threat that one may be executed for choosing to exercise
that right. Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that "the imposition of these difficult choices [will be] upheld as an inevitable attribute
of any legitimate
system which tolerates and encourages the negotia36
tion of pleas.'1
This affirmation of plea bargaining in even its most coercive contexts flows from the Court's crucial underlying thesis that plea bargaining is ultimately a voluntary process characterized by a give and
take between parties who possess relatively equal bargaining
power.137 Indeed, the Court itself has noted that "acceptance of the
basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any
notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply
because it is the end result of the bargaining process."138
As a result, the early cases invalidating appeal waivers on due
process "chill" theory 139 simply cannot be squared with current due
process doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court. Thus, cases
which reject this due process argument such as United States v.
Navarro-Botello,4 ° United States v. Wiggins,'' and Cubbage v.
State,141 must be judged more faithful to the Court's current position
on this issue.
B. The Doctrine of "Unconstitutional Conditions"
Before leaving the "chill" line of cases entirely, it must be noted
that the stark rejection of the rights-burdening theory in some of the
later plea bargaining cases is difficult to reconcile with another strain
of due process case law to which the Court continues to adhere (albeit
in somewhat inconsistent fashion)-namely, the murky doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions." 43 This doctrine posits that "even if a
state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it
136. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 31.
137. Parker,397 U.S. at 809.
138. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
139. See supra note 57.
140. 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. 905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990).
142. 498 A.2d 632 (Md. 1985).
143. See e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1413 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Cour4 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,State Power,and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1988); Seth
F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984).
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cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights.""'
The failure of the Court to address appeal waivers in particular or
plea bargaining in general in light of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions probably derives from two factors. First, the doctrine is
viewed classically as applying to indirect burdens upon the exercise of
fundamental rights. Plea bargaining involves, by contrast, direct bargaining for the waiver of such a right. Although this might be viewed
as a stronger case for application of the doctrine, the fact that plea
bargaining does not fit its classic contours might explain why the
Court has not addressed the question of whether the doctrine compels
a contrary result in this context.
The more likely explanation, however, is that "the rhetoric of the
cases ... and the commentary [has been] overwhelmingly dominated
[by an approach which] locates the harm of rights-pressuring condi1 45
tions on government benefits in their coercion of the beneficiary."'
Conditions placed upon the receipt of benefits are more likely to be
found unconstitutional when they render involuntary the choice to
forego the benefit. Such an approach is ill-suited to application to
plea bargaining because, as noted above, current theory dictates that
the plea bargaining process reflects an arms-length transaction in
which the defendant
is totally free to accept or reject the govern14 6
ment's offer.

C. What About Vindictiveness?
The very cases which abandoned the rights-burdening approach
of Pearce emphasized nonetheless the need for a process free from
vindictiveness. As stated by the Court in Blackledge, "[t]he lesson
that emerges from Pearce,Colton, and Chaffin is that the Due Process
Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment
upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness." ' 147
However, even if one could say that the "chill" line of cases metamorphosed into "vindictiveness" theory as a central tenet of due process analysis, this line of case law similarly offers little solace to
opponents of appeal waivers.
144. Epstein, supra note 143, at 6-7.
145. Sullivan, supra note 143, at 1419.
146. The correctness of the theory supporting this assumption is explored later in this

section.
147. 417 U.S. at 27.
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The vindictiveness cases held that prosecutors or judges violate
due process if they use their charging or sentencing powers to punish a
defendant for exercising rights otherwise guaranteed by law. For example, in Blackledge, the prosecutor was found to have violated due
process by refiling felony charges after the defendant had exercised
his statutory right to a trial de novo after a misdemeanor conviction
for assault.148 The opportunities for vindictiveness in such a situation
were viewed as being so great as to require a presumption that the
defendant was being punished for the exercise of his rights under the
149
statute.
It might similarly be argued that a prosecutor who bargains for
the waiver of appeal rights presents an equally unacceptable potential
for vindictiveness. Although the prosecutor is unlikely to be driven by
a personal animus to punish the accused, cases such as Blackledge
make it clear that the prosecutor's larger institutional interest in
avoiding "increased expenditures of prosecutorial resources"'5 0 can
be sufficient to raise a presumption of vindictiveness. It is precisely
this interest in conserving resources that motivates a prosecutor who
attempts to barter charge or sentence concessions for reductions in
her appellate caseload.
Nonetheless, such an extension of Blackledge to the appeal
waiver context must fail because the Court has been quite unequivocal in its declared intent to distinguish plea bargaining practice from
the rule established in the vindictiveness line of cases.'
The most
explicit statement of this intent appears in United States v. Goodwin, 52 in which the Court held that "changes in the charging decision
that occur in the context of plea negotiation are
an inaccurate mea' 1 53
sure of improper prosecutorial 'vindictiveness.
The Court's rationale for such separate treatment of plea negotiations has been variously stated, 54 but at its core is the same assump148. Id at 27-28.
149. Id
150. lId at 27.
151. See supra notes 132-136.
152. 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
153. Id at 379-80.
154. Professor Schulhofer has, for example, identified four different factors which the
Court has invoked at different times to distinguish plea bargaining from other settings
which present the potential for vindictiveness: (1) the advance warning of increases in
charges that occur in the plea context which is viewed as placing the defendant in a better
position to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer, (2) the presumption that the prosecutor's
motivation is less likely to be dictated by personal self-vindication in the plea context, (3)
the assessment that the prosecutor's institutional interests are more legitimate in the plea
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tion about the nature of plea bargaining that characterizes its due
process cases in general-i.e., the view that there can be "no such element of punishment in the 'give and take' of plea negotiation[s] so
long as the accused 'is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer,"" 55 and a defendant will be viewed as such a free actor
because of
156
the "relatively equal bargaining power" of the parties.
Thus, we see that the Court has distinguished plea bargaining
from several different strains of due process analysis-"chill" theory,
"vindictiveness" theory, and the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"-each of which might present significant questions about the
validity of appeal waivers. Central to this separate treatment ineach
instance has been the Court's core assumption that plea bargaining
takes place on a level playing field-that it is a negotiating process
characterized by arms-length transactions
between parties who enjoy
"relatively equal bargaining power.' 1 57
Whether this is an apt description of the plea process is open to
serious question. Some commentators reject the "mutuality of advantage" characterization, arguing instead that fear of heavier sentences
after trial makes "[t]he right to reject the proposed plea bargain...
largely chimerical."' 58 Others contend that "'[p]lea bargaining' is in
reality the prosecutor's unilateral administrative determination of the
level of the defendant's criminal culpability and the appropriate punishment for him,"' 59 and that observations to the contrary are nothing
more than "glib statement[s]." 60 Certainly it is fair to guess that the
defendant in People v. Cameron,'6 ' whose plea colloquy began this
Article, felt that he had no practical alternative but to accept the
judge's condition of an appeal waiver.' 62 Similarly, it would seem that
context than in the retrial context, and (4) the belief that the pretrial context of plea bargaining makes it less likely that the prosecutor will be motivated by improper factors. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARv. L. Rnv. 1037, 1091 n.178

(1984).
155. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 378.
156. Parker,397 U.S. at 809.
157. Id.
158. Note, Plea Bargainingand the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 564, 579 (1977).
159. Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 1983 U. i-L L. RE-v. 37, 38.

160. Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
161. People v. Cameron, No. 101512, slip op. at 2-3 (Alameda County Super. Ct. May
17, 1991).
162. Of course, it could certainly be said that Mr. Cameron had an alternative. He
could have refused to waive his appeal rights and thereby given up the benefit of the bargain he had separately negotiated with the prosecutor. The choice was his. But one could
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the defendant in People v. Ramos,163 who was faced with the alternative of waiving his appeal rights or rejecting the plea bargain and exposing himself to the death penalty was correctly described by the
court as having his range of choices so constrained that "it could not
[be] reasonably contemplated that defendant would exercise his 'option' to appeal."'16
Having said all this, however, it is difficult to distinguish Mr.
Cameron from the broad range of criminal defendants who are faced
everyday with the decision whether to waive their trial rights to secure
a concession as part of conventional plea bargaining-or to distinguish Mr. Ramos from Mr. Brady,165 Mr. Parker 66 or Mr. Alford. 167
Each of these defendants was "faced with grim alternatives"'168 of exactly the same magnitude as Mr. Ramos, but the courts found their
decision to waive their trial rights was voluntary. 169 In short, the due
process argument that bargaining for appeal waivers places an impermissibly coercive burden upon the free exercise of the right to appeal
is really no different from the venerable argument that plea bargaining in general is impermissibly coercive of waivers of the right to jury
trial. This latter argument has been emphatically rejected by the
Court as a necessary predicate to its broad approval of the plea bargaining process. 70
D.

Should Plea Bargaining be Revisited?

It may be time to revisit the basic assumptions underlying
Supreme Court approval of plea bargaining. Although plea bargaining currently enjoys widespread judicial acceptance and is even encouraged as "an essential component of the administration of
further argue that this "take it or leave it" approach is not terribly different from the choice
a potential robbery victim faces when confronted with the demand for "your money or
your life." As Professor Sullivan has pointed out, "coercion involves severe constraint on
choice rather than its elimination." Supra note 143, at 1442 n.114. Moreover, the greater
the differential between the sentence the defendant is offered with, as opposed to without,
an appeal waiver necessarily increases the restraint in choice and makes it more likely such
a plea was "coerced." Stephen J. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion as a Regulatory
System, 17 J. LEG. ST. 43, 70-74 (1988).
163. 292 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1968).
164. Id. at 940.
165, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
166. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
167. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
168. Id. at 36.
169. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; Parker,397 U.S. at 794; Alford, 400 U.S. at 38.
170. See supra note 169.
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justice," 171 the process was, through much of its history, viewed to be
constitutionally suspect. 172 As recently as 1958, the Supreme Court
struck down a bargained-for guilty plea as "improperly obtained."173
Thus, its lineage is not so ancient as to suggest that reconsideration
should be unthinkable. 174 In particular, it may be time to revisit the
Court's central assumption that the defendant and the prosecutor are
coequal adversaries in the plea bargaining context. Much of the law
review commentary has disputed this assumption. 75 Some have gone
so far as to suggest that if there ever was a "mutuality of advantage"
in the plea bargaining context, it was destroyed by opinions such as
76
1
Bordenkircherv. Hayes.

Furthermore, a recent but dramatic change in the plea bargaining
landscape makes such reconsideration particularly appropriate. This
change is the arrival in the federal system (as well as a number of state
systems) of new determinate sentencing schemes which tilt the playing
field significantly in favor of the prosecutor. 77 This is accomplished
by sharply increasing the penalty range for given criminal behavior
171. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
172. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History,79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 19-24
(1979).
173. Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26, 26 (1958). This opinion rested principally
upon a confession of error by the Solicitor General. Id. Nonetheless, the opinion was
widely regarded as a signal that the Court was ready to find the practice of plea bargaining
invalid. See Alschuler, supra note 172, at 35.
174. For arguments in general about the failings of plea bargaining, see Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster,101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
175. See Gifford, supra note 159, at 38-39; Malvina Halberstam, Towards NeutralPrinciples in the Administration of CriminalJustice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea BargainingProcess,73 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 48 (1982); John H.
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 U. Cm.L. REv. 3, 12-13 (1978); Mark Tushnet
& Jennifer Jaff, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure,35 CATH. U. L. REv. 361,
366 (1986); Stephen F. Ross, Note, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Ignoring ProsecutorialAbuses
in Plea Bargaining,66 CAL. L. REv. 875, 879-880 (1978).
176. 434 U.S. 357 (1987). See Ross, supra note 175, at 880. Bordenkircher involved a
defendant who refused to plead guilty to forgery, a state felony punishable by two to ten
years in prison. Id.at 358. The prosecutor then carried out a threat made during plea
bargaining conferences and charged the defendant under the state habitual criminal statute, thus subjecting him to a mandatory life sentence. Id. at 358-59. The Court found no
due process violation. Id.at 365.
177. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1994) (The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3351-3586 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998, created
the United States Sentencing Commission which was, in turn, charged with establishing the
sentencing policies and guidelines that are set forth in this manual). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1168-1170.6 (West 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1005-8-1 to 1005-8-4
(Smith-Hurd 1981); IND. CODE ANN.§§ 35-50-1-1 to 35-50-6-6 (Bums 1991); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 70.00(2)-(3), 70.02, 70.06, 220.00-43 (McKinney 1987).
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and transferring sentencing discretion away from the trial judge (and
parole boards) and lodging it with the prosecutor. 178
In the federal system, the accretion in sentencing range is largely
the result of mandatory minimum sentences, statutory changes in the
severity of drug sentences, and the sentencing commissioners' decision
to impose more severe sentences for white collar crimes. One federal
judge, Gerald W. Heaney, recently attempted to measure the increase
in sentencing in the Eighth Circuit and concluded that, although Congress expected that time served under the Guidelines would, in the
aggregate, be about the same as time served under pre-Guidelines
sentences, in fact, an offender sentenced under the Guidelines is likely
to serve more than twice as long as someone sentenced under preGuidelines law.' 79 Although the accuracy of these particular figures
has been challenged, 180 there seems little doubt that there have been
very significant increases in both the use and average length of prison
sentences under the Guidelines.' 8 ' In fact, a recent report by the
United States Sentencing Commission indicates that the Eighth Circuit figures compiled by Judge Heaney accurately reflect what is happening across the country in the wake of the Guidelines.'l Moreover,
the rush to mandatory sentencing schemes in the states represented "a
shift to policies [which] mandated that convicted criminals be incarcerated, and incarcerated for longer periods of time."' 8 3 These sentencing changes-rather than an increase in crime or in the number of
individuals in the crime-prone age group-account for the tremendous rise in national prison population figures since 1970.184
Such an increase in sentencing exposure for the accused translates directly into increased bargaining leverage for the prosecutor.
178. See infra note 185-195 and accompanying text.
179. Hon. Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity:Debating GuidelinesSentencing, 29
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771, 772 (1992).
180. Hon. William W. Wilkins, Jr. Response to Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 795

(1992).
181.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, THm FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACIS
ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION AND PROSECUTORIAL DiscRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 56-60 (1991).

A

182. I.
183. Jeff Bleich, Comment, The Politics of Prison Crowding,77 CAL.L. REv. 1125,1147
(1989). In California, the new "three strikes" sentencing law enacted in March 1994 states:
"It is the intent of the legislature in enacting [the following subdivisions] to ensure longer
prison sentences and greater punishment." CA. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1995).
184. Bleich, supra note 183, at 1146-47 (contending that America's prison population
increased more in the ten years between 1975 and 1985 than it had in all the preceding fifty
years combined).
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As Professor Alschuler has noted, "A prosecutor who can threaten
only a penalty of three years following a defendant's conviction at trial
plainly has less bargaining power than a prosecutor who can threaten
'
a sentence of twenty-five years."185
More importantly, if increases in
sentence exposure do in fact increase the coercive potential of plea
bargaining, then as the gap in sentence increases between what the
accused is offered for an appeal waiver and what the defendant can
expect without such a waiver, the waiver becomes less reliable
as an
86
indicator that the appeal was without merit to begin with.1
The second way in which these new sentencing schemes have
strengthened the prosecutor's hand is the manner in which they have
shifted most sentencing discretion away from the judge to the prosecutor. At the very heart of these sentencing reforms is an effort to
limit or structure judicial sentencing discretion to avoid "unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records."' 187 The
federal guidelines, for example, severely constrict the range of choices
open to the judge. When one adds the effect of mandatory minimums,1 8 probation ineligibility, 189 and other constraints on the sentencing powers of the judge, very little sentencing latitude is left to the
judge. As a consequence, the principle determinant of actual sentencing becomes the prosecutor's charging decision. This includes not
only which offenses are charged or bargained for but also which sentencing facts get to the judge and the probation department and even
whether mandatory minimums, as well as other significant constraints
on the judge's sentencing function, apply.
This wholesale transfer of discretionary powers was predicted in
the legal literature when such determinate sentencing schemes were
first being debated, 90 and it is now accepted as fact by courts,' 9 '
185. Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of
Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 569

(1978).
186. See Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 72, for a similar argument with respect to the
coercive effect of sentencing differentials as part of plea bargaining.
187. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (West 1993). Cf.CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1995) (stating that the purposes of California's determinate sentencing act are
best served by "uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense
under similar circumstances.").
188. See eg., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:436(c) (West Supp. 1995).
189. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 462 (West Supp. 1995).
190. William T. Pizzi, Prosecutorial Discretion, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme
Court's Opinion in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 6 HASTnNGS CoNsT. L.Q. 269, 296 (1978); Alschuler, supra note 185; Terance D. Miethe, Chargingand Plea BargainingPractices Under
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judges,' 92 sentencing administrators, 193 probation officers,19 4 and
academics. 195

It is noteworthy that virtually all of the Supreme Court's pronouncements about the fairness of plea bargaining are premised upon
a "mutuality of advantage"' 96 or "equal bargaining power"' 97 that is
believed to exist between the prosecutor and the defense. By way of
contrast, both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure' 98 and much
of the lower court authority' 99 prohibit bargaining between the judge
and the accused in large part because, in this latter situation, "the disparity of positions is extremely marked. ' 200 Indeed, it has been held
that precisely because the judge possesses such "awesome power to
impose a substantially longer or even maximum sentence in excess of
that proposed... [a] guilty plea predicated upon a judge's promise of
a definite sentence
by its very nature does not qualify as a free and
20 1
voluntary act.
If the awesome sentencing powers of the judge are viewed as
preventing arms-length transactions between the judge and the acDeterminateSentencing: An Investigationof the HydraulicDisplacementof Discretion,78 J.
CRIM.

L. &

CRIMINOLOGY

155 (1987).

191. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring) ("[T]he sentencing guidelines have replaced judicial discretion over sentencing with
prosecutorial discretion."); People v. Gottfried, 462 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (App. Div. 1983)
(Sandier, J., concurring) ("[T]he last several years ...[have] seen the power to sentence
defendants effectively transferred from judges to prosecutors.").
192. Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departuresfrom the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENr. R. 6, 7 (1992).
193. William W. Schwarzer, JudicialDiscretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT. R. 339,34041 (1991) (the author is Director of the Federal Judicial Center); Comments of Benjamin F.
Baer, Chairman, U.S. Parole Commission in Symposium, 1 FED. SENT. R. 359 (1989).
194. Maria Rodrigues McBride, Restoring Judicial Discretion, 5 FED. SENT. R. 219
(1993).
195. Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, JudicialImpressions of the Sentencing Guidelines, 2 FED. SENT. R. 94 (1989); Freed, infra note 285, at 1697; Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Sentencing Issues Facing the New Department of Justice, 5 FED. SENT. R. 225
(1993); Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining:A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. Rlv. 265 (1987); Ronald F. Wright, The Law of FederalSentencing in the Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term, 5 FED. SENT. R. 108 (1992); Elizabeth A.
Parsons, Note, Shifting the Balance of Power: ProsecutorialDiscretion Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 29 VAL. U. L. R. 417 (1994).
196. Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363.
197. Parker,397 U.S. at 809.
198. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1) provides that "the Court shall not participate in any
such [plea agreement] discussions."
199. See, e.g., Worcester,370 F.2d at 718; United States ex rel Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F.
Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493 n.3.
200. Elksnis, 256 F. Supp. at 255.
201. Id, at 254.
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cused and if the prosecution now exercises much of this once exclusive
power preserve of the judiciary, then perhaps it is time to revisit the
jurisprudential decision in Brady202 and its progeny to approve large
scale plea bargaining as a means of resolving criminal cases. It may
simply no longer be acceptable to merely assume that "the accused is
free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."203 The pressures
brought to bear upon criminal defendants to waive appellate review of
their treatment in the trial courts when faced with bargaining extremely long sentences which are in the virtual control of the prosecutor's office raises anew the traditional due process concerns of fairness
and voluntariness.
Of course, the traditional wisdom is that the criminal justice system is so completely dependent upon plea bargaining that its abolition
is unthinkable. This was probably most succinctly expressed by Chief
Justice Burger in Santobello v. New York, 2° where he observed that
"[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the
States and Federal Government would need to multiply by many
times the number of judges and court facilities.

' 20 5

However, in re-

practitioners 20 6

cent years a number of
and scholars20 7 have challenged this assessment and have argued both that the system could
accommodate greater reliance on trials and that plea bargaining is not
as inevitable as we tend to assume.
It is by no means certain who is right on this score, but we should
not allow cynicism to prevent us from even considering policy changes
if we feel them to be warranted. Furthermore, a reconsideration of
the basic assumptions about the voluntariness of the process could
lead to approaches short of a full scale abolition of plea bargaining. It
could, for example, lead the Court to rethink its unqualified embrace
of plea bargaining as the preferred means of caseload reduction and
lead it to disapprove some of the harsher manifestations of the
practice. 08
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

397 U.S. 742 (1970).
Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363.
404 U.S. 257 (1971).
Id. at 260.
See, e.g., David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 115 (1994).
207. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, supra note 154.
208. It might be difficult to reach consensus on which features of plea bargaining are
the most harsh or coercive since the current thinking by the Court is that none are. Nonetheless, this author would put at the top of any such list the practice of piling on additional
charges when a defendant refuses to engage in plea bargaining, which was approved by the
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Nonetheless, since the Court has shown no inclination to engage
in such a wholesale reassessment of its basic operation principles in
this area, the due process critique of appeal waivers must be viewed as
highly theoretical until such time as the Court indicates a willingness
to revisit this debate.
III. The Public Policy Issues
A. Introduction
Recent case law has explored at some length the question of
whether waivers of appeal rights are in the public interest or whether
they "infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and of
society as a whole."20 9 Although a few courts have disallowed appeal
waivers on public policy grounds,21 0 the vast majority have resolved
the public policy debate in favor of upholding such waivers. 2 " The
rationales most frequently expressed in favor of such waivers are the
need to deal with a caseload perceived to be overburdened with frivolous appeals,21 2 the need for finality in the process, 213 the view that the
practice furthers the defendant's interests because such waivers operate as an additional bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, 14
and the view that appeals are less necessary as a corrective process in
this situation because the defendant's interests are sufficiently protected by the close judicial supervision of the plea bargaining process
at the trial level.215
This Article suggests that the public policy debate has been unduly skewed in favor of caseload concerns, without sufficient consideration being given to the essential role that the right to appeal plays in
the criminal justice system. Further, this Article explores the public
policy arguments most frequently made in favor of appeal waivers and
concludes that most of them do not withstand close scrutiny.
Court in Bordenkircher. 434 U.S. at 363-64. Also near the top of this list would be the
practice of seeking appeal waivers as a condition of engaging in plea bargaining.
209. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
210. State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768 (Ariz. 1979); Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
211. See supra notes 50-55.
212. See Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818; Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775.
213. See Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322.
214. See, eg., Gibson, 348 A.2d at 774; People v. Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Ct.
App. 1985); Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1043 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
215. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Public Policy and Waiver of Rights in General

The concept that a promise or agreement may be unenforceable
at law because its terms conflict with public policy is one which derives
from traditional common law principles.216 As the Supreme Court observed in Rumery, "[t]he relevant principle is well established: a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in
by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the
the circumstances
2 17
agreement.

Although this principle may be well-established in the abstract, in
actual application most Supreme Court decisions are decidedly inhospitable to the notion that any agreement by a criminal defendant to
waive a right-either constitutional or statutory-could be presumptively against public policy. In fact, as the Court observed this past
term, such presumptions that do operate in this area are to the effect
that all rights, including even the most basic, are subject to waiver.218
Thus, to suggest, as this Article does, that negotiated waivers of appeal rights are against public policy and that courts should consider
disapproving them is to undertake a decidedly uphill task.
However, recent opinions of the Court render this undertaking
slightly less burdensome in two fundamental ways. First, the Court
has continued to adhere steadfastly to the basic principle that all
waiver agreements remain potentially subject to public policy review.
For example, in the recent Mezzanatto opinion, Justice Thomas voiced
agreement with the defense's core premise that "there may be some
evidentiary provisions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the
fact-finding process that they may never be waived without irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal courts."'2 19
Second, and more importantly, the Court has actually invalidated
the waiver of a fundamental right on public policy grounds in at least
one recent case. In Wheat v. United States,220 the Court specifically
declined to enforce a criminal defendant's waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel free of any conflict of interest.22 l The Court reasoned that to allow a defendant to be
216. See

RE=ATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRACrs

§ 178(1) (1981).

217. 480 U.S. at 392.
218. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 801 (approving the prosecutorial practice of soliciting
waivers of the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 against the use of statements
made during plea negotiations).
219. Id. at 803 (quoting C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, 21 FEDERAL PRACnCE & PROCEDURE § 5039, 207-08 (1977)).
220. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
221. Id. at 164.
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represented by an attorney with a conflict of interest-even where the
defendant had waived all rights against such representation-"not
only constitutes a breach of professional ethics and invites disrespect
for the integrity of the court, but it is also detrimental to the independent interest of the trial judge to be free from future attacks
over the adequacy of the waiver. '
Thus, the issue is not whether the courts can refuse on public policy grounds to accept a criminal defendant's negotiated waiver of
rights. That principle is clearly established, z 3 even though the Court
may, in general, be hesitant to take such action. Instead, the more
pertinent questions are how fundamental is the right that the defendant is being asked to waive and whether compelling the defendant to
decide to waive the right "impairs to an appreciable extent any of the
policies behind the rights involved." 4
Accordingly, any analysis of the public policy implications of appeal waivers must begin with an examination of the right to appeal, its
importance to the criminal justice system, and the policies it serves.
C. The Importance of the Right to Appeal to the Criminal Justice
System
The right to appeal in criminal cases has been variously described
as "a fundamental element of procedural fairness"' and the "final
guarantor of the fairness of the criminal process." 6 In fact, even the
suggestion of a judicial system where the determinations of a trial
level judicial tribunal would be insulated from review for correctness
would strike most people as offensive to our most deeply felt conceptions of procedural fairness. At the core of how we perceive our criminal justice system is a basic distrust of the awesome power of the state
and its ability to infringe upon individual rights. The potential for
such an abuse of power by either the prosecutor or the trial judge
traditionally has been viewed as requiring the availability of some
form of corrective process such as the right to appeal.
222. Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978)).
223. See, eg., United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1782 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that the guarantees of FED. R. CRim. P. 24(c) may not be waived by an
agreement to permit alternate jurors to sit in on jury deliberations).
224. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
225. ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATmNGTO APPELLATE CouRs 14 (1977).
226. Rossman, supra note 47, at 518.
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Although the right to appeal has not explicitly been recognized as
a federal constitutional right,227 it is such a de facto part of our system
that it has been described as "sacrosanct."
In fact, it has become
such an integral part of our judicial process that an impressive body of
scholarship has appeared in recent years maintaining that the right is,
in fact, an essential element of due process.2 29 At least one Supreme

Court justice has expressed the opinion that "[i]f the question were to
come before us in a proper case.., we would decide that a State must
afford at least some opportunity for review of convictions." 230
Such conjecture is given added weight by the Court's recent recognition in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg73 ' that, at least in certain civil
contexts, the right to judicial review is compelled by the due process
guarantee.232 In Honda, the Court held that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires judicial review of the size of
punitive damage awards. z33 In reaching this conclusion, the Court employed a line of reasoning that raises significant questions about
whether it would continue to stick to its position in previous cases that
the right to appeal in criminal cases is not an element of due process.
For example, in Honda, the Court's principle focus was the degree to which Oregon's failure to provide such review was a "departure from traditional procedures... [and] relevant common law."' 31
Thus, what was most telling for the Court was the fact that such punitive damage awards were not only subject to judicial review in early
common law courts but that a review of current practice disclosed that
"[i]n the federal courts and in every State, except Oregon, judges review the size of damage awards."' 5
Application of this analysis to the status of criminal appeals in
general is hardly conclusive, but it does provide grist for those who
would argue that the issue is ripe for reconsideration. Certainly the
227. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (holding that "[t]here is, of course, no
constitutional right to an appeal"); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) (holding that state has power to place terms and conditions upon criminal appeals).
228. Dalton, supra note 47, at 62.
229. See supra note 47. Actually, the question of whether the right to appeal is constitutional or not may be largely irrelevant for the purposes of this article because the Court
has made clear that if a statutory right is important enough, public policy can prevent its
waiver. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392.
230. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
231. 114 S.Ct. 2331 (1994).
232. Id at 2341.
233. Id
234. Id at 2335.
235. Id at 2338.
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right to appeal criminal judgments was not an ingrained part of our
common law history,236 and this is probably part of the reason why the
early cases declined to accord constitutional status to the right to appeal. However, the current practice is strikingly different and, in fact,
is comparable to the one considered by the Court in Honda. Currently, the right to appeal criminal judgments exists as a matter of
right in the federal system 237 and in 47 of the 50 states.2 38 Moreover,
in the three states where review is discretionary in nature, 239 the process has been swathed in such an impressive wrapping of protective
procedures that it is difficult to distinguish it from full review as a
matter of right.240
Of course, the holding in Honda is limited to the question of
whether some form of judicial review of jury verdicts is required and
does not directly address the question of whether a traditional appeals
process would be constitutionally compelled. Nonetheless, when one
examines the larger policy concerns expressed by the Court-particularly the need to protect against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication 24 1 and the problem that a guilty defendant may be unjustly
punished 24 2 -it is difficult not to draw parallels to the criminal process
and the right of criminal defendants to be free from arbitrary trial
court decisions.
D.

The Purposes of an Appeal

Although commentators have occasionally differed on the precise
articulation of the purposes served by an appeal and their relative importance, there is widespread agreement on why we have appeals,
particularly in the criminal system. The primary purpose is to correct
error and assure that mistakes in the lower court do not go unremedied.24 3 But beyond that, a variety of broader "institutional" purposes
236. For example, criminal appeals did not exist at the time the Constitution was
adopted and Congress did not provide for federal criminal appeals until the late nineteenth
century. Arkin, supra note 47, at 503-04.
237. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).
238. Arkin, supra note 47, at 513-14; Dalton, supra note 47, at 62 n.2.
239. N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 599.1 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-132 (Michie 1995);
W. VA. CoDE § 50-5-13 (1995).
240. Arkin, supra note 47, at 513-14; Dalton, supra note 47, at 62 n.2.
241. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2335.
242. Id.at 2339.
243. Contrast, for example, the A.B.A. Standards, supra note 225, at § 3.00 commen-

tary at 4, and PAUL D.

CARRINOTON, ET AL., JusTICE ON APPEAL 2-4

(1976) (both of

which point to a two-fold purpose of error correction and "institutional" review) with the
more sweeping claims of Shapiro, Appeal, 14 LAW & Soc'y REv. 629 (1980) and Dalton,
supra note 47, at 69 n.24.

164

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 23:127

have been identified. These include the articulation or systematic development of the law,2' the assurance that the law will be applied
245 and
with some degree of uniformity to equally situated individuals,
246
public.
the
of
eyes
the legitimation of the law in the
1.

Error Correction

The primary purpose of an appeal is to review lower court judgments for error.2 4 7 This "quality control"2 ' 8 function is found in most
legal systems and is viewed as particularly important to our own.24 9
The concern for accuracy of results is particularly imperative when
dealing with criminal judgments where the right to liberty is at
stake. 5 0
Recently, some conservative critics of the criminal justice system
have questioned this received wisdom. For example, Justice Rehnquist in a speech at the University of Florida Law School derided what
he described as our "obsessive concern that the result reached in a
particular case be the right one," and suggested that the time had
come to abolish appeals as a matter of right. 251 Former Solicitor General Rex Lee has opined that there is nothing in the Constitution or in
common sense that dictates that the decisions of an appellate court
are any more likely to be right than those of a trial court. 2
Whether or not Justice Rehnquist is correct in his characterization of our concern for accuracy in the criminal arena as an obsession,
one commentator seems to capture more closely the essence of our
system when he posits that before the state "officially stigmatizes a
citizen as standing outside the law and as deserving of society's condemnation, [it] must satisfy itself several times over that such a judg244.

CARRrNGTON,

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id at 2.
Resnik, supra note 47, at 619.
Dalton, supra note 47, at 66.
Rossman, supra note 47, at 519.

supra note 243, at 3.

249.

CARRiNGTO-N,

supra note 243, at 2.

250. This concern is probably best exemplified by the ancient epigram, attributed to
Blackstone, that "It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."
4 WmLiAm BLAcKsroNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (Philadelphia,
J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1861). Of course, this is not so much an argument for error correction in general as it is a declaration that errors which result in loss of liberty are particularly
anathema to our Anglo-American system of justice.
251. Resnik, supra note 47, at 605 (quoting Justice William Rehnquist, Address at the
75th Anniversary of the University of Florida College of Law and the Dedication of
Bruton-Geer Hall (Sept. 15, 1984) (on file at Cornell Law Review)).
252. Resnik, supra note 47, at 606.

Fall 19951

WAIVER OF THE RIGI-T TO APPEAL

ment is warranted." 3 Moreover, Solicitor General Lee's invocation
of common sense regarding decisionmakers is difficult to understand
if one merely compares the average caseload and contemplation time
per case of typical trial and appellate jurists. Trial courts operate at a
distinct disadvantage in this regard with many urban trial judges disposing of as many as 100 cases per day.254
This is particularly true of the guilty plea cases which are the subject of this Article. These cases are processed hurriedly. Close judicial supervision of the process is more a matter of form than of
substance. The files in one case are frequently being read while the
plea formalities of the previous case are being acted out on the judicial stage. Waivers of rights-if actually made in open court by the
defendant-are done in rote, liturgical fashion.2 5 5 More frequently
they are achieved by recourse to a check list that the defendant signs
at the direction of his counsel. 6 Factual bases for the pleas are more
often than not the subject of stipulations between counsel. 257 Sentencing decisions are commonly the rubber stamp approval of either a
plea disposition or a probation report recommendation or, even more
problematic, the hurried attempt to apply an enormously complex and
constantly changing sentencing scheme to the particular blend of sentencing factors represented by each case."s One simple truth controls: the calendar must be moved or the system will implode.
It is not surprising then that mistakes get made. Thus, there is
every reason to agree with Professor Resnick who suggests that "common sense" would always opt for "a decision of three people with
time for reflection over the decision of one person with little or no
time to think."' 259
253. Dalton, supra note 47, at 102.
254. Resnik, supra note 47, at 620.
255. See infra note 437.
256. Id.
257. Cases such as People v. Enright, 183 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1982), and People v. McGuire,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (1991), approve of the practice of establishing a factual basis through
stipulation.
258. The complexity of California's determinate sentencing scheme was captured by
Justice Gardner who wrote in Community Release Bd.v. Superior Ct. (Rabreau), 154 Cal.
Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1979), "[a]s a sentencing judge wends his way through the labyrinthine
procedures of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, he must wonder, as he utters some of its
more esoteric incantations, if, perchance, the Legislature had not exhumed some long departed Byzantine scholar to create its seemingly endless and convoluted complexities. Indeed, in some ways it resembles the best offerings of those who author bureaucratic
memoranda, income tax forms, insurance policies or instructions for the assembly of packaged toys." Id at 384 n.1.
259. Resnik, supra note 47, at 620.
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These concerns about accuracy which derive from the need of
trial courts to process enormous numbers of criminal cases (particularly guilty plea cases) carry over with equal force to the defense attorneys who are charged with the duty of protecting the interests of
the defendants processed through these busy courts. Most of these
attorneys are likely to be appointed, overworked, and overwhelmed.
In many cases, they may simply be inadequate. 260 This can be a particular problem in guilty plea cases which are processed quickly yet
are likely to involve complicated sentencing issues. A recent report of
the United States Sentencing Commission concluded that most private criminal defense attorneys generally do not understand the federal sentencing guidelines which control the ultimate fate of their
clients, 26 1 and yet federal sentencing error is an issue typically covered
by an appeal waiver.
Thus, there is every reason to believe that there will be errors in
the trial court which require the corrective process of appellate review. Moreover, one critical empirical fact demonstrates the need for
appeals in criminal cases-despite persistent characterization of the
criminal appellate docket as dominated by frivolous claims, the success rate in criminal appeals (when one includes sentencing issues) is
frequently as high as 25%,262 and often compares favorably with the
success rate enjoyed by appellants in civil cases. 263 Even if the success
rate were lower, at least one Supreme Court Justice has observed that
"the reversal rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the
state courts, while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their right to appeal would expose
them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction. ''2 14
a. Can Appeal Waivers Serve as an Alternative to Error Correction
Mechanisms?
Many of the decisions upholding appeal waivers operate on an
assumption (often unstated) that the error correction purposes of an
appeal are not compromised by widespread reliance upon appeal
260. Id. at 622-23. See also Dalton, supra note 47, at 102.
261. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,supra note 181, at 6. It should be noted that the Fed-

eral Sentencing Guidelines present a bewildering mine field of statutory complexity. For
examples of how even the most routine cases can raise a host of perplexing legal questions,
see Owen S. Walker, Litigation-EnmeshedSentencing: How the GuidelinesHave Changed
the Practiceof FederalCriminal Law, 25 U.C. DAviS. L. REv.639 (1992).
262. NCSC, supra note 29, at 8.
263. This empirical data is explored in detail, infira, in the text accompanying notes 398 422.
264. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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waivers. The belief is that in each such case the defendant will have
entered into a voluntary agreement to forego the benefits of appeal
and would not have done so if there were serious errors which the
defendant felt were of greater
importance than the concessions re2 65
ceived as part of the bargain.
This line of reasoning is based on two further assumptions about
the nature of the process, each of which is open to serious question.
The first is that the defendant is actually a free actor in a position to
make a truly voluntary choice. This assumption was challenged at
length in Part II of this Article and those arguments will not be repeated here except to emphasize two observations. First, rather than
entering an arms length trading arrangement where appeal rights are
bartered for specific charge or sentence concessions, many defendants
find themselves faced instead with a flat requirement that they waive
their appeal rights as a precondition to bargaining. Viewed in this
way, appeal waivers look less like an additional bargaining chip that
the defendant brings to the table and more like the price of admission
to engage in the plea bargaining process at all. More specifically,
when required in such an across the board fashion, they bear little, if
any, relationship to the specific merits of the claim the defendant
wishes to raise on appeal.
Second, in those situations where prosecutors bargain selectively
for the waiver of appeal rights, it stands to reason that they are most
likely to do so in those cases where defendants have arguably meritorious appeal issues, otherwise there would be little incentive on the
part of the prosecutor to make significant concessions. This means
that the greater the likelihood that the defendant was deprived of fair
treatment in the trial court, the greater will be the pressure to give up
access to an appeal. Thus, not only do appeal waivers operate most
coercively on those who have the greatest reason to appeal but they
function as the worst form of screening mechanism, removing from
the system precisely the cases we would most want appealed.
There are additional problems with reliance upon appeal waivers
as a substitute for the error correction function of an appeal. Principal
among these is the question of whether the defendant is the person
best situated to judge the strength of the issues on appeal. Presumably, the defendant is the person best situated to determine the need
for a trial to adjudicate guilt or innocence. As the Supreme Court has
265. See, e.g., Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320 ("Whatever appellate issues might have
been available ... were speculative compared to the certainty derived from a negotiated
plan with a set sentence parameter.").
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observed, a guilty plea constitutes "an admission of factual guilt so
reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes
the issue of factual guilt from the case. '266 But, as one commentator
has urged, "[n]othing the defendant could say or do... could serve to
certify the 'correctness' of the trial court's sentencing decision ' 267 or
any other legal decision made by the trial judge that would serve as
the basis for an appeal.
b. The Special Problem of Waiver of Future Sentencing Error
Reliance upon appeal waivers as a substitute for a formal error
correction process is particularly problematic when the issue on appeal is sentencing error that has occurred after the entry of the appeal
waiver. It is very difficult to defend a theory that defendant's knowing
calculation of the significance of the error renders the need for an
appeal superfluous when that very same defendant is unaware of
either the nature or the magnitude of the error at the time the appeal
waiver is entered.
Consequently, the issue of waiver of future sentencing error is
potentially one of the most divisive questions for those courts which
otherwise approve of appeal waivers. At least one state court has specifically declined to uphold appeal waivers when the issue involves
courts, on the other hand,
future sentencing error. 68 The federal
26 9
have generally upheld such waivers.

c. Limits of the Error Correction Rationale
If error correction were the only purpose served by an appeal
then the above-mentioned factors might justify the cost-benefit tradeoffs of widespread reliance upon appeal waivers. However, the institutional purposes served by the right to appeal in our criminal justice
system go far beyond the individual interests of any particular defendant. When we take into account the fact that almost 90% of all criminal cases are disposed of by guilty plea,27 then we must recognize that
we are talking about more than whether an individual defendant
266. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2.
267. Johnson, supra note 115, at 710.
268. Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451.
269. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827; Melancon, 972 F.2d 566; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318. This
issue is discussed in greater detail in section IV, infra, where it will be argued that waivers

of this sort are not only an inadequate substitute for the error correction function of an
appeal but that they also fail the test of knowing waiver of rights established by the
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst.
270. See supra note 3.
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should be free to waive a particular right for sufficient inducement.
We must confront a practice which presents the potential for closing
the doors of the American criminal courtroom and shielding most
criminal cases from any judicial review. The succeeding sections examine the broader institutional implications raised by such a practice.
2.

Uniform Application of the Law

A core purpose served by the appellate process is its unifying
function-that is, it provides a mechanism for assuring the evenhanded application of the law. Trial courts work independently of
each other and lack the "self-regulating capacity to promote uniformity among their decisions."'2 71 It is only by means of appellate review
that we guarantee that all courts move in a common direction and that
an individual's treatment in the courts is guided by legal principle
rather than the whim of an individual trial judge. This perceived need
for consistency in the application of legal doctrine is particularly acute
in the criminal justice system because it is a system which adjudicates
liberty interests. Uniformity of treatment is at the heart of our notions of criminal procedural fairness and, although we do not always
achieve the goal, it is our unstinting commitment to the ideal which
gives legitimacy to the system.
This imperative of uniform application of the law has particular
force in the area of guilty plea appeals because such a large percentage of these appeals involve sentencing issues. In recent years uniformity of treatment has become the touchstone of most sentencing
schemes, and appellate review of sentences is increasingly seen as a
key vehicle for achieving this goal.
Although appellate review was at one time virtually unheard of in
the sentencing process, sentencing law has undergone enormous
change in the last two decades. 272 In both the federal and state systems, the practice has evolved from one grounded in virtually unreviewable trial court discretion to one confined by elaborate and
complex sentencing statutes which regulate the sentencing decision.
Not surprisingly, most of these new statutory schemes provide for appellate review of sentences.2 73
271.

CARRINOTON,

supra note 243, at 2.

272. Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Underminingthe Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61 (1993).
273. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988); ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4037(A) (1989);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West 1982); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-409(1) (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 51-195 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-6(a) (1990); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-5-4.1 (1982); IND. CONST. art. VII, § 4; IowA CODE § 814.6(1)(a) (1979); MD.
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These sentencing schemes are the result of a nationwide reform
movement2 7 4 whose principle goal has been to bring order to a system
of sentencing that was previously described as being "lawless," and
"so far unconfined that, except for frequently monstrous maximum
limits, they are effectively subject to no law at all." 2 75 A report of the
American Bar Association noted that "in no other area of law does
one man exercise such unrestricted power. No other country in the
free world permits this condition to exist."276
The response of both Congress and a significant number of state
legislatures was to bring about a profound change in the nature of
sentencing theory and practice. Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984277 and a significant number of states either followed
suit or-in the case of states like Minnesota 27 8 and California 27 9 -led
the way. The result was an elaborate codification of sentencing along
the lines of two basic models: a guidelines system (often promulgated
by a sentencing commission) which structures sentencing discretion
tightly2 80 or a system of presumptive sentences for each offense with a
narrow range of discretion accorded to the trial judge to depart up or
down.

28 1

ANN., CRIM. L. § 645JA (1992); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 278, §§ 28-28C (1981); MIm.
§ 244.11 (1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1386(c) (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35401 (1990).
CODE

STAT.

274. Probably the most influential force behind this movement was Judge Marvin E.
Frankel of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, whose book
on the subject, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrriiouT ORDER (1972), has been called "[a]
key document in the movement for sentencing reform." Marc Miller, Purposesat Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413,422 (1992). Other examples of advocacy for sentencing reform
include Daniel R. Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 207 (1971), and A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

(1968).

275. FRANKEL, supra note 274, at 8.
276. A.B.A., supra note 274, at 1-2.
277. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3351-3586
(1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
278. MINN. STAT. § 244 (1990).
279. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.95 (West Supp. 1992).
280. Minnesota was the first state to establish a guidelines system in 1978. See MINN.
STAT. § 244 (1990). The Minnesota system served as a model for the Federal Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 as well as guidelines systems in 13 other states. See Lowenthal, supra
note 272, at 63 n.8.
281. California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law in 1976, CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1170-1170.95 (West Supp. 1992), was the forerunner here with at least six states adopting a similar model. See Lowenthal, supra note 272, at 63.
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The principle objective of this reform movement was the elimination of disparity in sentencing.'
It was this aspect of sentencing reform that was most instrumental in enlisting the support of individual
legislators283 and it was this legislative intent that most frequently
found expression in the text of the new statutes themselves. 2 4
With this in mind, it is easy to see how reliance upon appeal waivers contravenes the policy underlying sentencing reform. The purpose
of such waivers is, of course, the elimination of appellate review and
without such review trial courts once again are free to exercise the
untrammeled discretion that led to the birth of the reform movement.
Moreover, given the fact that reform has been generally achieved
through the passage of extremely complex and confusing sentencing
structures, disparity is just as likely to result from judicial error as it is
from judicial discretion. Yet the effect of appeal waivers is to insulate
2 85
such error from review, compounding the likelihood of disparity.
282. Helen G. Corrothers, Rights in Conflict: FairnessIssues in The FederalSentencing
Guidelines,26 CRYM. L. BULL. 38, 40 (1990); Kenneth R. Feinberg, FederalCriminalSentencing Reform: Congressand The UnitedStates Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FoRi.ST
L. REV. 291, 295 (1993); Lowenthal, supra note 272, at 63; William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John
R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of The FederalSentencing Guidelines,41 S. C.
L. REv. 495, 495 (1990).
283. Feinberg, supra note 282, at 295; The Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress
in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences,
and The Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FoREST L. REv.
185, 187 (1993).
284. The Federal Sentencing Reform Act states that one of the goals of the guidelines is
"to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988). California's
Determinate Sentencing Law sets forth "the elimination of disparity and the provision of
uniformity of sentences" as its declared legislative purpose. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170
(West. Supp. 1992).
285. An alternative viewpoint has been propounded by Professor Daniel J. Freed in
FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992). He suggests that sentence disparity at the trial level
reflects greater sensitivity on the part of trial judges to the full range of differences
presented by various offenders, id. at 1728, and that appellate courts might, in fact, be
interpreting the federal guidelines more strictly than Congress intended. Id. at 1753. This
may be true and may ultimately provide a telling critique of determinate sentencing
schemes. Nonetheless, even if it is true, waiver of appellate review of sentences by defendants is not the solution. If appellate courts are, in fact, applying the guidelines more strictly
than trial courts, this phenomenon is almost certainly played out through appeals brought
by the prosecution rather than by the defense. With rare exception, appeal waivers only
restrict the accused from seeking the corrective process of appellate review. To date the
sole exception is United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1991), which applies
principles of reciprocity to appeal waivers. If an accused has been sentenced unfairly by an
overly harsh trial court application of the sentencing guidelines, it is unlikely that he will
receive even harsher treatment at the hands of the appellate courts whose reversals, after
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It is for this reason that Minnesota, the jurisdiction which, along
with California, is often credited with launching the determinate sentencing reform movement,286 has flatly rejected waivers of appeal of
sentencing error as being inherently incompatible with the goals of
sentence reform. In Ballweber v. State,2g ' the Minnesota Court of Appeal found that appellate review of sentencing was an essential element of that state's influential guidelines system and held that
"[v]indication of the Guidelines' stated goals.., of reducing sentencing disparity, and providing uniformity in sentencing" requires a per
se rule against waivers of sentencing appeals. 88 It is the thesis of this
article that the reasoning of this opinion applies with full force to
every sentencing scheme which sets sentence uniformity as a goal and
provides for appellate review of sentences as a mechanism for achieving that goal.289
3. Articulation of Legal Doctrine
A related but distinct function served by appeals is their role in
the orderly development of constitutional and other legal doctrine.
Historically, courts of appeal have been relied upon to "announce,
clarify and harmonize the rules of decision employed by the legal system in which they serve."12 90 Without an appellate process available to

the criminal justice system, some have questioned how legal doctrine
would ever evolve in the orderly fashion which we expect.291 This is a
concern that extends far beyond an individual defendant's desire for
access to corrective process. As Justice Scalia observed last term in an
opinion unanimously disapproving routine vacatur of judgments in
cases that are settled after appeal is filed, "judicial precedents are...
all, are most frequently applied to unguided downward sentence departures. Freed, supra
note 285, at 1729.
286. Lowenthal, supra note 272, at 63.
287. 457 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
288. Id- at 217.
289. This would include, at a minimum, the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
which is modeled closely after the Minnesota statute as well as the 13 state systems listed
supra note 273.
290. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 3. Cf. Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the
System of Precedent:Selective Publication,Depublication,and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. RFv. 109 (1995); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073

(1984).
291. Arkin, supranote 47, at 576. Cf. Gibson, 348 A.2d at 785 (Pashman, J., dissenting)
("The right of appeal implicates many values which transcend the immediate interests of
the parties: indeed, appellate supervision of the trial courts and the operation of the appellate process as a device for fashioning new law are at the very heart of our judicial
system.").
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valuable to the legal community as a whole" and "are not merely the
property of private litigants." 219
This need for the guiding hand of appellate review is particularly
acute in the criminal justice system because, as one commentator has
noted, it is appellate decisions which "set forth the boundaries within
which police, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys must operate
if they wish to conform to the rules."2 93
a. Law Articulation and Sentencing Appeal
Guilty pleas appear prominently for consideration in terms of law
articulation because of the frequency with which they involve sentencing issues. Just as uniformity of sentences was a major goal driving
sentence reform and appellate review of sentencing,2 94 so too was the
perceived need for a system of orderly development of sentencing law.
The legislative history of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
for example, discloses that Congress believed that appellate review of
sentencing would assure "case law development of the appropriate
reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines. This, in turn, will assist
the Commission in refining the sentencing guidelines as the need
arises. '295 Similarly, the American Bar Association Standards For
Criminal Justice urge that one of the principle objectives of appellate
review of sentences should be to "promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just. 2' 96
This need for orderly appellate guidance takes on added significance when one factors in the enormous complexity of most modern
sentencing schemes. The federal guidelines are particularly formidable,29 7 having been described by one commentator as being "ridiculously complicated. '298 In addition, they are constantly changing. For
example, from 1988 through 1992, the Federal Sentencing Commission promulgated 465 amendments to the guidelines and commentary. 299 State systems suffer from similar problems of complexity 3°°
292. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, No. 93714, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7982, *16 (November 8, 1994).
293. Rossman, supra note 47, at 519.
294. See supra notes 271-289 and accompanying text.
295. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 149, 151 (1983).
296. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTCE, Standard 20-1.2(d) (1980).
297. Terence Dunworth & Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and The Federal
Courts: The Guidelines Experience, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 99, 107 (1992).
298. Conference on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101
L.J. 2053, 2060 (1992).
299. Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 297, at 107.
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and also change with unsettling frequency, 301 creating, in essence, a
moving target for trial judges and attorneys. Without some appellate
overlay to provide for rational development, the potential for chaotic
application of these modem sentencing schemes is a problem of great
dimensions.
Appellate courts have responded to this problem with a significant increase in the number of cases reviewing sentencing error.3 °2
Moreover, the response has provided some significant measure of the
guidance one would desire. For example, the 1991 Report of the
United States Sentencing Commission concluded that "[a] body of
sentencing law, notably similar among circuits in most respects, has
quickly developed. The Commission has benefitted from this evolving
3
body of appellate law.

30

It would seem then that the right to appeal was intended to play
an important role in defining the proper scope and meaning of the
new sentencing statutes and that it has, by and large, succeeded in
doing so. Widespread use of waivers of sentencing error conflicts directly with these basic policies.
b. Law Articulation and Appeals of Suppression Motions
In those few states which permit an appeal of a suppression motion after a guilty plea,30 4 such claims represent a significant portion of
guilty plea appeals. 3

5

These claims also represent a major source of

trial court error. As a result, a high proportion of those appellate vic300. See, e.g., Diane Beale, California'sDeterminate Sentencing Law: Punishment for
Defendants, Cqmplexity for the Courts, S.F. ATr'y, Aug./Sept. 1993, at 18.
301. State determinate sentencing schemes provide an almost irresistible temptation to
legislators to tinker with sentencing limits-motivated usually by some shifting combination of the need to respond to crime rates and the desire to remain in elective office. See,
e.g., Hallye Jordan, "Crime of the Month:" Sarcasm Obscures the Debate; L.A. DAILY J.,
May 5, 1994, at 7. California's Determinate Sentencing Act has been amended more than
1,000 times since it was passed in 1976. Id. Most recently, it was amended with a hastily
and sloppily drafted "Three Strikes and You're Out" statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 667
(West 1994), that may require years of appellate review before its conflicting provisions
can be rationalized. See, e.g., CAL. JUD. COUNCIL REP. TO PRESIDING JUDGES AND SOLE
JUDGES OF THE TRIAL C's. (March 18, 1994).
302. JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., 1983 ANN. REP. 3, 9 ("increased appeals and increased
error may coincide with the adoption of a new and complex [sentencing] law") [hereinafter
Jcc-1983 REPORT]; Freed, supra note 285, at 1727 ("[A]bout 5,400 [federal] sentences are
being appealed annually. Since sentences were rarely reviewed before the Guidelines, this
number represents a significant addition to appellate caseloads.").
303. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 181, at 25.
304. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (Deering 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 710.70(2) (McKinney 1994).
305. NCSC, supra note 29, at 44 n.8.
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tories which defendants are able to obtain involve suppression issues.30 6 Thus, it should come as no surprise that waiver of these

appellate claims is frequently sought as an element of plea bargaining,
and that some of the first cases upholding appeal waivers involved
waiver of these claims.30 7

Of course, in most jurisdictions this is never an appeal waiver issue. Search and seizure claims are a classic example of those deprivations of constitutional rights which, because they involve issues that
arose prior to the entry of the guilty plea, are deemed forfeited by
virtue of the guilty plea. 308 It is only in states such as California 30 9 and
New York 310 which have created statutory exceptions to this rule that
appeal rights exist which may, in turn, be subject to bargains for their
waiver.
Given that such constitutional claims are viewed as being automatically forfeited by virtue of the plea itself, it is difficult to argue
that public policy forbids their waiver when they are resuscitated by
state statute-unless, of course, such statutes themselves reflect such a
policy against waiver. It might be argued, for instance, that these very
statutes represent the considered judgment of the Legislature that
search and seizure claims are so integral to the concept of individual
liberty that these claims cannot be ignored simply because an individual defendant has chosen to take advantage of a bargained-for sentence or charge reduction. The problem with such an argument is that
the legislative history of these statutes suggests a more modest agenda
on the part of the legislatures which passed them. Both California
Penal Code Section 1538.5(m) and New York Criminal Procedure
Law Section 710.70(2) have been found to be premised on the more
mundane policy of protecting the public fisc by avoiding the expense
of pro forma trials which would otherwise be required in order to preserve search issues for appeal.3 1 '
Thus, the public policy argument against waiver of such statutory
rights is a difficult argument which has been rejected by those courts
which have considered it.3 12 Nonetheless, there is a serious public policy issue lurking here. Cases upholding appeal waivers in this arena
306. IM at 17.
307. See e.g., People v. Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Williams,
331 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975).
308. Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 293; Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267.
309. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (Deering 1995).
310. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.70(2) (McKinney 1994).
311. Hil4 117 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22; Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531-32.
312. See, eg., Williams, 331 N.E.2d at 684; Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
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are part of a larger trend over the last twenty or so years of removing
search and seizure claims from virtually all higher court review. For
example, as previously mentioned, a guilty plea automatically forfeits
appellate review of search and seizure claims in the almost 90% of the
criminal caseload which is resolved by pleas of guilty. 313 In addition,
search and seizure claims are removed entirely from federal habeas
corpus review if there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate
them in the state system. 14 Lastly, in cases involving warrants, the
magistrate's decision to issue the warrant can not even be reviewed in
the trial court, let alone a court of appeal so long as the police officer
executing the warrant had an objective, good faith belief in its
315
validity.
This general trend toward the removal of search issues from most
forms of review is not inadvertent. It is a deliberate choice on the part
of the Court reflecting a judgment that "application of [the exclusionary rule should be] restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. ' 31 6 Thus, besides the
previously mentioned limits on appellate review, the Court has also
317
limited application of the exclusionary rule in the areas of standing,
impeachment, 318 grand jury testimony,319 civil proceedings, 320 and the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, 321 to name a few.
Without revisiting the entire question of the proper scope of the
exclusionary rule, it does appear that there are particular problems
with removing its operation from most forms of appellate review. At
the very least, the complexity of these constitutional issues raises the
very real question of whether a single authority can generate dependably accurate results over time. 2 Application of constitutional doctrine is, in general, a very difficult judicial task that is made all the
more difficult by constantly shifting trends and countertrends that
characterize Supreme Court guidance in this area. In this sense, it is
313. See supra note 3.
314. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976).
315. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
316. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
317. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 174 (1969).
318. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walden v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954).
319. Calandra,414 U.S. at 354.
320. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976).
321. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273 (1978); Wong Sun v. United States,

371 U.S. 471 (1963).
322. Arkin, supra note 47, at 574.
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quite different from such relatively more straightforward tasks as statutory interpretation or such discretion-based tasks as evidentiary rulings. The chance for error is greater and, given that these issues cut to
the core of individual liberty, we must view with some concern the fact
that such decision-making has been largely removed from appellate
review. On a more pragmatic level, the political pressures upon local
trial courts when called upon to enforce the constitutional rights of
accused criminals during periods of public outrage over crime raise
nagging questions about the ability of first tier courts to fulfill the
mandate of the Constitution. As one commentator has noted:
In the field of criminal procedure a strong local interest competes only against an ideal. Local interest is concerned with the
particular case and with the guilt or innocence of the particular
individual.... While it is hard indeed for any judge to set apart
the question of the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant
and focus solely upon the procedural aspects of the case, it becomes easier in a reviewing court, where the impact of the evidence is diluted. The more remote the court, the easier it is to
consider the case in terms of a hypothetical defendant accused
of crime, instead
of a particular man whose guilt has been
32 3
established.
While the current application of cost benefit analysis by the
Supreme Court concludes that there is only marginal deterrent value
in permitting review of suppression issues in the areas discussed, there
is another way to view this matter. It seems quite plausible that permitting waiver of appeal rights in these cases undercuts deterrence by
diluting the effect of the exclusionary rule in the nearly 90% of the
caseload which is disposed of by pleas.324
Thus, it would seem that the purposes of appeals are particularly
compromised when appeal waivers of suppression claims are permitted. Of course, this conclusion takes one far beyond appeal waivers.
If there is merit to this viewpoint, then it would require not merely
rethinking the appeal waiver cases, but also Tollett v. Henderson and
the entire line of forfeiture cases as they apply to suppression issues. 325 This is not likely to be on the current court's agenda.
323. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalismand State CriminalProcedure,70 HARv. L. REv. 1,
5 (1956).
324. For a similar argument with respect to Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970),
and the entire line of forfeiture cases, see Tigar, supra note 18, at 21.
325. An appellate court in New York has adopted a very unique approach to the public
policy issues presented by appeal waivers of suppression issues. Ventura holds simply that
there is no legitimate state interest in upholding appeal waivers in cases where the search
issue is dispositive. Id. at 531-32. The court reasoned that the major prejudice to the state
in overturning appeal waivers is the predicament of having to try a state case on stale
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4. Legitimation of the CriminalJustice System
A final institutional purpose of appeals is their legitimation function, that is, they serve "to legitimate decisions of the state, to dignify
the participants, and to make meaningful the interaction between individuals and the state." 326 In other words, appeals are an essential
part of the overall procedural structure which operates to assure us
that the system is a fair one. It is essential that the system not only be
fair but that it be perceived as fair. The continued willingness of the
public to support the coercive imposition of the criminal sanctioneven in these times of increased demand for tough law enforcementis based ultimately on the perception that the system operates in an
32 7
even-handed and just manner.
The right to appeal plays an important role in this legitimating
process. It assures the public, rightly or wrongly, that trial court decisions will be reviewed for accuracy and fairness and adds an aura of
probity to the criminal justice process. Indeed, it can be argued that
the current public insistence upon more and more punitive application
of the criminal law is embraced by such a wide spectrum of the populace precisely because it is taken on faith that these laws will be subject to a review procedure that checks for aberrational applications.
One writer has gone so far as to describe this aspect of the appellate
function as providing a "fig leaf" 328 for the criminal justice system,
reasoning that "[r]egardless of whether appeal of right improves upon
the efforts of trial court judges, it arguably serves to make them more
acceptable." 329
evidence after having relied upon the pled bargain to resolve the case. Id. at 531-32. Since
there will be no such trial where the search issue is dispositive, the court concludes that the
only other possible prejudice to the state is the loss of the conviction itself. Id.at 532.
Since there is no legitimate state interest in preserving an unjust conviction for the sake of
the conviction alone, the court reasons that there is no sound reason for upholding such
waivers. Id. Although the reasoning of the Ventura opinion has not been adopted by other
courts, it finds support in an earlier article written by Professor Westen. Westen, supra

note 26. There, Professor Westen isolates a similar theory of prejudice as rationalizing
such divergent Supreme Court forfeiture opinions as Tollett and Blackledge, and argues
that such a showing of prejudice should be required before the state is ever permitted to
rely upon a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal. Westen, supra note 26, at 1258.
326. Resnik, supra note 47, at 619. Cf. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 8-9; ROBERT
M. COVER & OWEN M. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979) (arguing that procedure is an important component of fairness).
327. WAYNE R. LA FAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 42 (2d ed.

1992).
328. Dalton, supra note 47, at 98.
329. I& at 98.
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The right to appeal may play a further legitimating role beyond
that of reassuring the general public. The availability of a corrective
process is instrumental in assuring defendants that their treatment at
the hands of the state is guided by principles of fairness rather than
the individual caprice of a given trial judge.330 When pleas must be
made without access to appeal protections-particularly when defendants must surrender such protections as the price of plea bargainingit is less likely that the defendant will accept his treatment as fair.
This, in turn, makes the processes of
rehabilitation and assimilation
331
back into society more problematic.
The right to appeal thus serves a multitude of important goals,
some specific to the individual appellant but most serving the larger
institutional purposes of the criminal justice system itself. Widespread
reliance upon waivers of the right to appeal undermines each of these
purposes in a definable and substantial way. This is particularly so
when one considers that nearly 90% of the criminal caseload is disposed of by plea and the unmistakable trend is to condition increasingly greater numbers of these guilty pleas with a waiver of the right
to appeal. Thus, such waivers seriously imperil the public policy that
underlies the right to appeal in criminal cases and should, accordingly,
be disapproved.
However, with rare exception, appeal waivers have not been
found to violate public policy. Quite the contrary, they have been
found to further public policy. How can this result be justified? It is
time to turn to the public policy arguments traditionally made in support of appeal waivers to inquire whether they are sufficiently compelling to overcome the objections to the practice and justify the
prevailing approach courts have taken toward them.
E. The Public Policy Arguments in Favor of Appeal Waivers Do Not
Withstand Close Scrutiny

As noted previously, most courts which have considered the public policy questions raised by waivers of appeal rights have concluded
330. Research in the social science field indicates that if a litigant receives a negative
outcome but perceives that the process used to reach that decision was fair, the aggrieved
party is more likely to accept the negative outcome. See, e.g., Scott Barclay & Jerry
Goldman, Does Procedural Justice Plus Appellate Process Equal Appellate Justice?, Paper
delivered to Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Research Committee on the Sociology of Law of the International Sociological Association, University of
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June 1991, at 20. (on file with author).
331. Arkin, supra note 47, at 577-78 n.300.
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that public policy favors such waivers. 3 The rationales developed by
these courts can be organized loosely into four categories: (1) the
need to protect the system from being overwhelmed by what is seen as
an enormous number of frivolous appeals,333 (2) the need for finality
in the process, 334 (3) the belief that the practice furthers the defendant's interests because such waivers operate as an important bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process,335 and (4) the view that
appeals are less necessary as a corrective process in this arena because
the defendant's interests are sufficiently protected by close judicial supervision of plea bargaining practice at the trial level. 36
The cases tend to invoke these arguments with little in the way of
supporting data other than citation to previous cases which have articulated a similar view. Examination of each of these rationales in
some detail shows that each fails to find significant support when measured against the realities of modem criminal caseloads and practice.
1. Are the Courts Really Being Overwhelmed by Frivolous Appeals?
The conventional wisdom is that, since there is a constitutional
guarantee to a free appeal, 337 there is little incentive not to appeal
and, as a result, the system is awash in enormous numbers of criminal
appeals, most of which are without merit.338 Former Chief Justice
Warren Burger espoused such a view when he complained 'that the
typical criminal appeal is "an endless quest for technical errors unrelated to guilt or innocence" that makes a "mockery of justice" and
undercuts the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. 3 9 A number 34
of0
courts have complained about the proliferation of criminal appeals
and some have translated this into an issue of wasted taxpayer dollars.
For example, a recent California Court of Appeal opinion deplored
what it viewed as "the unnecessary burden placed on California taxpayers and on an already overburdened Attorney General's office and
332. See supra text accompanying notes 209-240.
333. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19; Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775.
334. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322.
335. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1043 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. at
405-06; Gibson, 348 A.2d at 774.
336. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
337. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
338. NCSC, supra note 29, at 5.
339. Warren E. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief
Justice of the United States, 67 A.B.A. J.290, 292 (1981). Cf MACKLIN FLEMING, THE
PRICE OF PERFEcr JusTICE (1974).
340. Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775.
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Court of Appeal by meritless and even frivolous criminal appeals,"' 1
"squandering
while a federal appeals court judge has complained of
3 42
public funds for pointless briefs in hopeless appeals.
There are really two separate components to this critique: first,
the claim that the criminal appellate docket is expanding at an alarming rate and, second, the assertion that most criminal appeals-particularly those arising from guilty pleas-are frivolous. Each of these
will be explored in turn.
a. What Has Happened to the Criminal Appellate Docket in the
Wake of Douglas v. California?
In the period immediately following Douglas v. California's1963
guarantee of appointed counsel to indigent appellants for a first ap343
peal of right, the criminal appellate caseload rose dramatically.
This should hardly come as a surprise. Most criminal defendants who
appeal44are indigent. It has been estimated that the figure is as high as
90%,3 although in many jurisdictions the figure is, in fact, much
higher.345 Those defendants who may have had the resources to retain counsel have often expended those funds on trial counsel. More
importantly, most defendants who appeal are felons who have been
sentenced to prison346 -a circumstance which virtually assures that
they will not have the ability to pay for counsel.
Prior to Douglas v. California,such an indigent defendant who
wished to appeal had virtually no alternative other than to pursue his
remedies in propriapersona. As daunting as this prospect might be to
a defendant at the trial stage, 7 the appellate phase with its total emphasis on written, legal argumentation, is even less accessible to most
pro per litigants. Thus, it is not surprising that prior to Douglas very
few defendants appealed; nor is it surprising that once this opinion
341. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
342. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1044 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting).
343. In the period between 1963 and 1983 appellate caseloads increased at a faster pace
than trial court filings, doubling every 8 to 10 years. NCSC, supra note 29, at 43 n.1.

344. CARRINGTON, supra note 243, at 59.
345. See, e.g., Letter from Ron Barrow, Clerk of Court, California First District Court
of Appeal (on file with author), indicates that in Fiscal Year 1992-1993 of 1,195 criminal
appeals, only 59, or 5%, had retained counsel.
346. Thomas Y. Davies, Affirmed. A Study of CriminalAppeals and Decision-Making
Norms in a CaliforniaCourt of Appea4 1982 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 543, 559 (1982).
347. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), guarantees this right. Even at the trial
level it is exercised relatively infrequently, perhaps in observance of the old adage that "He
who represents himself has a fool for a client."
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made counsel available to defendants, criminal appellate filings
skyrocketed.
It is contended, however, that the rate of increase in criminal appeals continued to rise for a period extending well beyond what we
might reasonably attribute to the impact of Douglas and that
caseloads continue to rise even today3 48 It is certainly true that criminal appellate caseloads continued to grow at a rate greater than trial
court filings for the two decades following Douglas.3 49 This Article
will explore the possible explanations for this below. However, since
the early 1980's, despite perceptions to the contrary, 350 there seems to
have been a leveling off in the growth of criminal appeals.3 51 In the
federal courts of appeal from 1977 to 1987 the number of criminal
appeals rose from 4,738 to 5,260, or a relatively unspectacular 11%
increase over a period of 11 years. 352 In some jurisdictions, there has
been an actual decrease in the ratio of appellate filings to trial court
filings.. For example, in California between 1982-83 and 1991-92, criminal appeals increased 38% from 5,137 to 7,114.53 But this must be
contrasted with a 127% increase in trial court filings from 72,390 to
164,583 over the same period. 354 When measured by what was happening in the trial courts, this represents a substantial decrease in the
rate of growth of appeals. The fact that there are, nonetheless, more
criminal cases on the appellate docket is not the result of choices
made by convicted defendants. It is the result of choices made by
public officials to respond more aggressively to crime and thus funnel
355
more cases into the criminal justice pipeline in the first place.
However, even though the rate of growth has leveled off, the absolute numbers remain high. What besides Douglas v. California
might explain this?
348. Joy A. Chapper & Roger A. Hanson, Taking the Delay Out of Criminal Appeals,

27 JUDGE'S J. 7 (Winter 1988).
349. NCSC, supra note 29, 43 n.1.
350. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
351. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991 557 (1992), [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICS]. These numbers

jumped dramatically with the passage of the federal sentencing guidelines, growing by
57.9% from 1988 to 1990. Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 297, at 99. The impact of
the federal guidelines upon the appellate caseload is discussed in the next section.
352. Id.
353. JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. 1993 ANN. REP., Vol. II, at 25 and 59 [hereinafter JCC-93
REPORT].

354. Id.
355. Id-
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b. The Impact of the New Sentencing Statutes
Probably the single most important factor in the growth of
caseload, other than Douglas itself, has been the passage of determinate sentencing statutes in the federal system and in a large number of
the states. Prior to the arrival of these statutes there were virtually no
appeals of sentencing issues. A sentence within statutory lifiits was
viewed as generally not reviewable.3 5 6 The advent of modem sentencing statutes changed all this. In place of a system grounded almost
entirely in discretionary decision-making, these new sentencing statutes provided detailed sentencing schemes with rules that regulated
the sentencing decision and a complexity that provided ample room
for judicial error. In addition, these sentencing acts for the first time
provided for appellate review of sentencing decisions as a matter of
right.357 By permitting litigants to appeal when previously they were
denied the right, and by simultaneously creating a system so complicated it virtually invites error, it is no surprise that the number of appeals has increased.
The numbers have, in fact, gone up. In many jurisdictions, it is
possible to look at a graph of appellate filings and identify exactly
when a new sentencing act went into effect. For example, while appeals held steady for more than a decade in the federal courts, 358 a
dramatic spike appears on the graph after November 1, 1987 when the
federal guidelines went into effect. 35 9 From June 30, 1988 to June 30,
1990, federal criminal appeals grew by 57.9%.36 0 Moreover, just over
half of that two year increase involved appeals of sentences alone.3 6 '
In California, where the state's Judicial Council concluded that the
new Determinate Sentencing Act was responsible not only for more
appeals, but also more error,362 guilty plea appeals constituted only
13.8% of all appeals before the Act went into effect. 363 Currently in
California, guilty plea appeals average approximately one-third of
criminal appeals. 3"
356. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424,443 (1974); United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 44647 (1972).
357. See supra note 273.
358. See supra note 351.
359. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988). Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984).
360. Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 297, at 104 n.13.
361. Id.
362. JCC-1983 REPORT, supra note 302, pt. 1, at 9.
363. Davies, supra note 346, at 558.
364. Letter from Mark Cutler, Exec. Dir., Cent. Cal. App. Proj. to the author (Feb. 13,

1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter CCAP letter].
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This data illustrates that the new sentencing statutes have had a
major impact on appellate caseloads. The growth of criminal appeals
is not the result of bored defendants with nothing better to do than
create mischief in the criminal courts. It derives in large measure
from these sentencing schemes which rely on appeals as a vehicle for
achieving the larger goal of uniformity in sentencing and which are
often so bewilderingly complex as to virtually guarantee appellate issues in a high percentage of sentencing decisions.
c. The Impact of Rapid Changes in Sentencing Law and Criminal
Law in General
A secondary impact of the new determinate sentencing statutes
derives from the ease with which they may be amended. Fixed
sentences can easily be adjusted upward with the stroke of a legislative pen. Although indeterminate schemes may also be amended, the
fact that the ultimate sentence is determined sometime down the road
by an administrative agency, such as a parole board, lessens the immediacy of the impact of such amendments.
This ability to make certain and immediate changes in the
amount of time served by convicted criminals holds a certain allure for
legislators as a sure-fire method for earning their tough-on-crime
stripes during an election year. In fact, it is interesting to chart
changes in sentencing law in comparison to election year cycles. Professor Lowenthal has done such a comparison with regard to how and
when Congress chose to enact and then change the penalty scheme for
drug trafficking and the use of firearms. 365 The enactment and
changes in these penalty schemes corresponded directly to election
year cycles. 366 For example, one month before the 1984 elections,
Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Penalties Amendment
Act,367 providing mandatory minimum sentences for several drug offenses. Two years later, in the next election year, Congress enacted
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986368 which set mandatory minimum
sentences according to the weight of the controlled substances possessed. 369 In 1988, another election year, Congress passed the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, toughening the mandatory minimum
365. Lowenthal, supra note 272, at 64 n.9.
366. Id.

367. Enacted as a chapter of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 501, 98 Stat. 1837, 2068 (1984).
368. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
369. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (1991).
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sentences once again.3 70 Finally, in 1990, when the Judicial Council
recommended the repeal of existing mandatory minimum sentences,
Congress responded instead to the pressure of election year politics
and provided for additional mandatory minimums. 371
Election motivated ratcheting-up of penalty provisions is not limited to the federal branch. In California, it has been estimated that
lawmakers (and voters through the initiative process) have amended
the Penal Code more than 1,000 times since 1977 when
the state's
372
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act went into effect.
If the consequence of all this was merely annual changes in the
number of years assigned as penalty to each individual crime then the
resulting confusion might be relatively manageable. However, the
tinkering is not limited to numbers-it goes to the very structure of
the sentencing schemes themselves. For example, in California, the
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act began with four different triads
from which the sentencing judge was to pick a specific sentence depending upon the severity of the crime and the individual characteris373
tics of the defendant. These have now grown to more than twenty.
The Act originally provided for eight enhancements which added one,
two, or three years to the sentence, depending upon factors relating to
the defendant or the manner in which the crime was committed.
These have grown to approximately 110. 374 To this one must add
other basic changes in the structure of the sentencing process such as
mandatory consecutive sentences, 375 probation ineligibility, 376 and, of
course, the new "Three Strikes You're Out" law,37 7 all of which further complicate matters. Many of these were passed in the heat of
election year politics and are characterized by confusing or inherently
conflicting provisions.378
370. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4181, 4370 (1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 844(a) (1991)).
371. Lowenthal supra note 272, at 64 n.9.
372. Jordan, supra note 301, at 7.

373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4500, 4501 (West 1986).
376. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.06(a) (West 1994). Cf CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1203(e)(1) (West 1994) (stating a defendant armed with a weapon is presumptively ineligible for probation unless, in the interests of justice, the court makes certain findings on
the record).
377. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1994).

378. Charles Finnie, In the Courts, Mixed Results for (3 Strikes), L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 14,
1994, at 1.
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The temptation to tinker is not limited to legislative bodies alone.
Between 1988 and 1991 the United States Sentencing Commission
9
promulgated 434 amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines.
380
amendments.
additional
38
In 1992, the commission proposed
Adding this element of constant revision to statutory sentencing
schemes that were complex to begin with has resulted in a system that
one commentator delicately described as "ridiculously complicated. '38 ' The consequence is that error is common among judges,
prosecutors, and defense counsel. It comes as no surprise, therefore,
that we have seen a sizeable increase in the number of sentencing appeals in the wake of these statutory changes. What should surprise
and concern us is the response in many jurisdictions-which is to a
movement to curtail such appeals through increased reliance upon appeal waivers.382 Restricting defendants' appellate rights as a means of
containing caseload pressure can only result in insulating erroneous
trial court sentencing decisions from review. Further, it has the appearance of being unfair, if not cynical.
d. Other Factors Affecting Appellate Caseloads
There are a variety of other factors that have contributed to the
rise in the criminal appellate caseload, most of which are also beyond
the control of individual criminal defendants.
Chief among these has been the recent rise in trial court filings.
The nation's response to crime over the past decade has been to bring
the full force of the criminal justice system to bear, particularly in the
so-called "war against drugs." As a result, the number of criminal filings has risen at an exponential rate. In the federal system, there was
a 40% increase in felony criminal filings between 1985 and 1992.83 In
California, between 1982-83 and 1991-92 superior court filings in criminal cases rose 127% from 72,390 to 164,583. 384 Nationwide, drug arrests during that period more than doubled from 471,200 to 980,700.385
At the same time, those people who were being charged were going to
379. Dunworth & Weisselberg, supra note 297, at 107 n.27.
380. IL
381. Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101
YALE LJ.2053, 2060 (1992).
382. See, e.g., Olsen, 264 Cal. Rptr. 817. See also Haines, supra note 13, at 227; Tsimbinos, supra note 11, at 4.
383. Richard C. Reuben, Keeping Pace with Judicial Vacancies, A.B.A. J., Jul. 1994, at
34.
384. JCC-1993 REPORT, supra note 353, Vol. II, at 59.
385. U.S. BUREAU OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 1993, June 1994, at 8.
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prison at a much higher rate,386 a very significant factor for appellate
dockets because defendants sentenced to prison are much more likely
to appeal than those who are not.38 7 From 1980 to 1993, the number
388
of state and federal prison inmates almost tripled.
Although the public and its elected representatives have shown
single-minded purpose in toughening crime provisions, they have been
less vigilant in providing the funding necessary to accomplish those
retributive goals. With the exception of correctional budgets (which
nearly doubled nationwide between 1986 and 1991),389 funding of the
total criminal justice system has seen a proportional decrease during
that same time period. 39° This is particularly true with regard to the
single most important resource with regard to caseload: the size of the
judiciary. In California, for example, despite the huge rise in caseload,
not one additional judgeship at the trial or appellate level has been
created since 1987. 391 As California's Chief Justice Lucas has noted,
"One of the fundamental principles upheld by a responsive justice system is that the public court system must have adequate resources to
perform its constitutional role.''392 It is against this backdrop that
public policy arguments in support of reducing dockets by waiving appellate rights have a particularly hollow ring.
One last factor in the growth of appellate dockets should be mentioned, although its precise impact is difficult to measure. This is the
establishment of intermediate appellate courts in the various state systems. Although conceived as a means of relieving pressure on state
supreme courts, 93 the establishment of such courts has often been accompanied by an overall increase in appellate court filings. 394 In 1957,
such courts existed in only thirteen states, a number which had remained unchanged since 1911.1 95 By the end of 1987, they existed in
thirty-eight states.396
Although the growth period seems largely to be behind us, appellate caseloads have certainly expanded significantly in the last thirty
years. This growth has not been the haphazard and aimless phenome386. Id at 2.
387. Davies, supra note 346, at 559.
388. U.S. BUREAU OF JUST., supra note 385, at 1.

389. A.B.A.,
390. Id

THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN A'm oAL REPORT, at ii

391. JCC-1993

REPORT,

supra note 353, Vol. I, at 17.

392. Id
393.
394.
395.
396.

U.S. BUREAU OF JUST., THE
Id
NCSC, supra note 29, at 28.
Id

GROWTH OF APPEALS

6 (Feb. 1985).

(1993).
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non described by some critics.397 Rather, it has been a rational response to a series of dramatic changes in the judicial landscape. Chief
among these has been the Supreme Court's recognition of a right to
counsel on appeal; the emergence of new sentencing laws which both
complicate sentencing and create an appellate right where none existed; and the growing volatility and severity of criminal law provisions
in general. It is not surprising that these factors have led to caseload
growth. However, it is unfortunate that the public response has been
the development of a movement to curtail procedural rights and insulate error from review rather than support for an increase in resources
to accommodate these changes.
e. Are Most Criminal Appeals Frivolous?
The public policy arguments in support of appeal waivers go beyond caseload numbers to broad assertions that most criminal appeals
are frivolous.3 98 We are told that the system is not only awash in criminal appeals but that most are so totally without merit that they
amount to nothing more than "squandering public funds for pointless
briefs in hopeless appeals. ' 399 Again, the empirical data tells a different tale.
Before addressing the data, however, some preliminary observations are in order. The first is that the normative underpinnings of the
criminal appellate process are such that one should not expect large
numbers of reversals of criminal convictions even where arguably
meritorious legal issues are present. As Thomas Davies has noted, the
norms of criminal appellate decision-making are heavily weighted in
favor of affirmance and this is true despite indicators that there are
legal errors in many affirmed cases.4 °0 The appellate norms to which
Davies principally refers are the substantial evidence rule 401 and the
397. See Burger, supra note 339.
398. CARRINOTON, supra note 243, at 91-96. It should be noted in passing that Rule 3.1
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure prohibit counsel from asserting a claim that is frivolous. The quoted assertions
about the nature of the criminal appellate caseload seem to presume a level of professional
misconduct on the part of the practicing bar that would be shocking, if true.
399. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1044 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting).

400. Davies, supra note 346, at 551.
401. The substantial evidence rule maintains that appellate courts should not disturb
lower court factual rulings as long as there is any evidentiary support for those rulings. As
formulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Newland, 104 P.2d 778 (Cal.
1940), before an appellate court will overturn a trial court factual determination, "it must
be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support the conclusion reached in the court below." Id.at 780. As applied by
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harmless error rule,4 ° 2 each of which is predicated upon broad
precepts of deference to lower court decision-making and each of
which strongly predisposes appellate courts to affirm criminal cases
whether or not there has been factual or legal error below. As a result, appellate courts approach criminal appeals in an "affirmance
mode," which creates a form of self-fulfilling prophecy-a tautological
concept of frivolous appeals under which appeals are viewed as hopeless because they are certain to be affirmed and affirmed because they
are viewed as hopeless.40 3
A second preliminary observation is that the manner in which
one defines success is critical in assessing the merit of criminal appeals. If one limits the definition to a complete reversal of the trial
court judgment then criminal appellate success rates are quite low.
For example, in California in 1991-92, only 5% of all criminal appeals
resulted in a reversal. 4 ° However, this is a far too narrow definition
of merit. The relief most criminal defendants are seeking on appeal is
something far short of a complete reversal. A very significant percentage are seeking some form of what is loosely classified as a "modification" of the judgment and can include such diverse forms of relief
most reviewing courts, the rule is seen as requiring acceptance of trial court's factual findings unless they are virtually devoid of any support. Davies, supra note 346, at 598.
402. Although the harmless error doctrine is formulated differently depending upon the
nature of the underlying error, in general it stands for the principle that "on appeal from a
judgment it is a cardinal rule that the duty devolves upon the appellant not only to specify
the error of which he complains, but also to establish to a reasonable certainty that without
such error having been committed, the result of the trial of the action would have been
substantially different from that which was actually reached by the trial court." People v.
Britton, 6 Cal. 2d 10, 13 (1936). Like the substantial evidence rule, this is a formidable
norm of affirmance, but one which encourages affirmance in the face of legal as opposed to
factual error. Reliance upon the harmless error doctrine by appellate courts to affirm convictions has increased substantially in recent years. See, eg., United States v. Innamorati,
996 F.2d 456, 475 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Errors that the Supreme Court deems to warrant
automatic reversal are rare."); Stephen H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: ConstitutionalSneak
Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRimIoLoGY 421 (1980); C. Elliot Kessler, Death and Harmlessness: Application of the Harmless ErrorRule by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty
Cases-A Comparison & Critique, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 41 (1991); Gregory Mitchell, Against
"Overwhelming" Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L.
REv. 1335 (1994); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless ConstitutionalError,88
COLUM. L. RIv. 79 (1988); Donald A. Winslow, Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Errorin
Criminal Cases, 64 CoRNELL L. REv. 538 (1979). The increased reliance on this doctrine
led Justice Marshall to condemn what he viewed to be "a disturbing and increasingly widespread trend among some courts to sanction egregious violations of the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants by blandly reciting the formula 'harmless error' whenever it
appears that the accused was factually guilty." Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912, 915
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
403. Davies, supra note 346, at 582.
404. JCC-RPoRT 1993, supra note 353, Vol. II, at 28.
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as correction of sentencing error, vacating a conviction on a lesser included offense or overturning one of several convictions. 40 5 This is
particularly true of guilty plea appeals in which correction of sentencing error is usually the most significant, if not the only, relief sought by
the appellant.4 °6
While the statistics vary to some degree from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the overwhelming message they provide is that when one factors in the full measure of what criminal defendants are actually
seeking on appeal, their success rate compares surprisingly well to that
of their civil counterparts. A recent study of federal appeals disclosed
that in 1991, 13.6% of all criminal40defendants
in federal appellate
7
courts received some form of relief.
Another study revealed that in 1989, 11.3% of all federal criminal
appellants obtained relief.408 Of particular interest was the finding
that of those cases resulting in remand rather than reversal, 51% resulted in a different decision in the second proceeding.409 Thus, the
relief obtained by criminal appellants is real, not merely symbolic-a
fact that is significantly at odds with current assumptions about the
frivolity of such claims. A study of criminal appeals in the Second
Circuit from 1989 to 1991 disclosed a success rate of 19%, while civil
appellants obtained relief in 27% of the cases during the same
period.410
The figures for state courts are comparable. A study of appeals
in New York in 1984 demonstrated that 23% of defendants received
relief.411

In California in 1991-92, 23% of criminal defendants ob-

41 2
tained relief as compared to 36% of civil appellants.
Moreover, if we break these figures down and look at guilty pleas
in particular, we again find the reality of criminal appellate adjudication to be dramatically different from its description. For example, a
recent study of guilty plea appeals in the third and fifth appellate districts in California showed that in fiscal year 1992-93, of a total of 714
405. NCSC, supra note 29, at 34.
406. Id. at 18-19.
407. Jon 0. Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 629, 630 n.2
(1992). It is interesting to note that Mr. Newman felt compelled to defend those numbers
from criticism of the reverse sort from what we have been examining-that is, criticism
suggesting that the reversal rate in criminal cases might be too high. Id at 630.
408. Arkin, supra note 47, at 515.
409. Id. at 515 n.54.
410. Newman, supra note 407, at 632.
411. Arkin, supra note 47, at 516.
412. JCC-1993 REPORT, supra note 353, Vol. II, at 28.
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413
guilty plea appeals, 168 (or 24%) obtained some form of relief.
More specifically, of those 168 successful appeals, 38 resulted in a
complete reversal, 89 were modified, 36 were remanded, 4 were affirmed with a remand on a particular issue, and one was a hybrid affirmance/reversal. 414 This high rate of success on guilty plea appealsalthough contrary to conventional wisdom-should not be surprising.
Appeals from pleas of guilty are traditionally characterized by a high
percentage of sentencing issues and other studies have shown that
criminal defendants415
enjoy the highest rate of success with determinate
sentencing appeals.
Finally, as at least one federal judge has observed, the drain
which guilty plea appeals place upon scarce judicial resources is vastly
overstated because the results of such appeals are rarely, if ever, new
trials. 416 The vast majority of successful guilty plea appeals merely
require new sentencing which involves substantially less temporal and
financial resources than do new trials.41 7 Moreover, sentence appeals
themselves consume far fewer resources in that they generally have
far shorter records and require significantly less briefing and much
shorter judicial opinions. 418 Lastly, as the California sentence appeal
study shows, those appeals which are, in fact, without merit tend to be
shunted out of the system at an early state of the proceedings with a
minimal expenditure of judicial resources. In the two judicial districts
studied, fully one-third of the sentence appeals were disposed of
either by voluntary abandonment by the defendant or no-merit
briefs419 by the attorney. This brings the success rate of those guilty
plea appeals which were fully pursued on the merits closer to 35%.420
413. CCAP Letter, supra note 364.
414. Id.
415. NCSC, supra note 29, at 5.
416. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478,483 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
417. Id
418. Johnson, supra note 115, at 711.
419. CCAP Letter, supra note 364. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) and, in California, People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979), an appointed attorney
who determines that a criminal appeal is frivolous may petition the court to withdraw but
must file a brief declaring that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Anders, 386 U.S.
at 742; Wende, 25 Cal. 3d at 441. This, in turn, places an obligation upon the court to
review the record independently to determine whether the appeal is, in fact, without merit.
Although some have complained that this process is cumbersome, see, e.g., Philip Hager,
An Appeal Losing Appeal, May 1994 CAL. LAW. 43, in reality such Anders appeals are
usually handled by court staff and involve very minimal briefing and opinion writingusually a statement of facts plus a declaration of no issues.
420. These percentages are derived by subtracting the 236 cases resolved by abandonment or no-merit briefs from the total of 714 guilty plea cases. The remainder of 478 active
cases was then used to factor the 168 cases which resulted in some relief for the accused.
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Thus, close scrutiny raises significant doubts about traditional
public policy claims that the active encouragement of appeal waivers
is a justifiable response to an appellate process that is being overwhelmed by a glut of frivolous appeals. Criminal appellate caseloads
have increased in recent years but for very good reasons. Criminal
appeals, when measured by the success rate of relief sought, are no
more likely to be without merit than are civil appeals. The reversal
rate for criminal appeals is certainly high enough to justify Justice
Brennan's observation that "depriving defendants of their right to appeal would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction."421 Thus, there is no good reason to single out guilty plea
appeals for elimination. Moreover, even if caseload concerns were
sufficient to justify efforts to reduce the numbers of these appeals, the
mechanism chosen-promotion of the waiver of appeal rights-is arguably the least equitable screening device because it eliminates cases
without regard to merit. In fact, as argued earlier, appeal waivers may
bear an inverse relationship to the merit of the underlying claims.422
If appeal waivers eliminated only frivolous appeals then few would
disagree that they furthered public policy. But appeal waivers eliminate review of meritorious claims with equal effect and it is difficult to
see how public policy is advanced by the removal of such claims from
the system. Thus, the "judicial resources" component of the public
policy argument supporting appeal waivers is overstated and fails to
provide a convincing rationale for the surrender of the fundamental
right to appeal.
2. Would Defendants be Deprived of an Important Bargaining Chip?
The appeal waiver cases assume that the availability of appeal
waivers provides an important benefit to criminal defendants because
the ability to waive the right to appeal increases the defendant's leverage at the plea bargaining table. To quote one federal judge, "Criminal defendants usually have few enough bargaining chips; sparing the
government the time and expense of a trial and appeal is the primary
currency in which they must deal."412 The Supreme Court has concluded that it would "hesitate to elevate more diffused public interests
above [the defendant's] considered decision that he would benefit personally from the agreement."'4 24 As a corollary to this line of reason421. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 757 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
422. See supra text accompanying notes 126-127.
423. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d at 1043 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
424. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 395. The most extreme articulation of this viewpoint is provided by Frank Easterbrook, who would define the value of all things (including personal
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ing, it is argued that prosecutors might become wary of entering into
plea agreements if they are consistently repudiated by means of appeal.4 5 Therefore, it is argued that any decision to prohibit, or even
limit, appeal waivers would do a terrible disservice to the accused.
However, this is difficult to imagine.
Preliminarily, it is not at all clear that the ability to waive appeal
rights does, in fact, operate as a bargaining chip. In more and more
jurisdictions, waiver of appeal rights is a precondition to plea bargaining. 426 Thus, an appeal waiver is rarely a discrete item of trade to be
bartered for specified concessions; rather, it is the price of admission
to plea bargaining. 42 7 If this is true, then the danger defendants face
from the possible abolition of appeal waivers is the inability to engage
in plea bargaining. This is difficult to credit. In fact, it is difficult to
believe abolition of appeal waivers would have any impact whatsoever
because the criminal justice system is simply too dependent upon plea
bargaining to take seriously the notion that prosecutors would cause
plea bargaining to come to a halt simply because courts found appeal
waivers to violate public policy.
However, assuming that the traditional viewpoint is partially correct and that some defendants do succeed in "purchasing" specific
concessions by proffering waivers of their appeal rights, there are still
problems with advancing this as a policy argument in favor of appeal
waivers.
First of all, it is reasonable to assume that the parties would simply bargain over something else if this "chip" were no longer available. Even under the most favorable theory, the waiver of appeal
rights is not the defendant's most powerful bargaining tool. Defendants bargain with trial level prosecutors: The real benefit that a defendant can offer to such an adversary is the removal of one more case
from a crushing caseload. In other words, it is the waiver of trial that
rights) in terms of their ability to be bargained in trade: "In [unconstitutional conditions]
cases, people sell their constitutional rights in ways that, they believe, make them better
off. They prefer the benefits of the agreement to the exercise of their rights. If people can
obtain benefits from selling their rights, why should they be prevented from doing so? One
aspect of the value of a right-whether a constitutional right or title to land-is that it can
be sold and both parties to the bargain made better off. A right that cannot be sold is
worth less than an otherwise-identical right that may be sold." Frank Easterbrook, Insider
Trading,SecretAgents, Evidentiary Privilegesand the Production of Information, 1981 SuP.
Cr. Rnv. 309, 347.
425. See, eg., Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 290.

426. See supra text accompanying note 1.
427. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (quoting the trial judge in that case as saying, "I nor-

mally insist on that [an appeal waiver] on [sic] the price of my plea agreement").
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is likely to be most attractive to the prosecutor who is doing the bargaining; not the waiver of appeal. A different prosecutor will almost
certainly have responsibility for any possible appeal and, while the
trial prosecutor might have the larger needs of the system in mind, it is
the pragmatic demands of his or her own personal situation that are
most likely to affect how he or she sees the value of a given bargain.
Finally, even if none of the above were true-even if individual
defendants might be disadvantaged by the unavailability of appeal
waivers as a bargaining tool-we should still find that public policy
cuts against their perpetuation. That is because the long-range interests of criminal defendants in general, and the larger interests of the
criminal justice system as a whole, are furthered by the discontinuance
of appeal waivers.
As Professor Alschuler observed in commenting upon plea bargaining in general, "the long-range effect of a series of apparently voluntary transactions, each apparently 'value maximizing' when viewed
individually, [would] be the creation of a society in which values that
most of us hold dear would mean less than they should, a society in
which we might not especially want to live." 4z, Phrased another way,
even if a given defendant might benefit from the ability to bargain
away appeal rights, criminal defendants in general will do better in a
system where they do not have to forfeit their right to judicial review
in order to engage in plea bargaining. Lastly, the criminal justice system as a whole will benefit more from a policy that permits a public
airing of what happens in the trial courts than it will from one which
closes the doors of the criminal courthouse to judicial review in the
name of defendants' rights.
3. Are the Interests of Defendants Who Plead Guilty Adequately
Protected by the Plea Process Itself?

The cases upholding appeal waivers describe a plea process that is
replete with procedural safeguards at the trial level and which provides many of the protections that might otherwise flow from an appeal process.429 As described by the Supreme Court, "[p]lea
bargaining takes place only under judicial supervision, an important
check against abuse. ' 430 As amplified by a Michigan appellate court:
In such proceedings, the trial judge serves as a neutral and detached party to the plea negotiations and possesses an obligation
428. Alsehuler, supra note 127, at 699.
429. See, e.g., Gibson, 348 A.2d at 772.
430. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to ensure that the agreed-upon disposition will serve the interests of justice .... Likewise, a prosecutor's duty is not to enter
into plea agreements at any expense, but to see that justice is
served. For those skeptical enough to suggest the trial court and
prosecutor may simultaneously lose sight of their respective obligations, we add the protection afforded defendants by their attorneys .

. .

. [T]he attorney will protect the defendant's

interests, be those interests best served by preserving the right
to appeal or waiving the same.43 '
Thus, the cases assure us that, as long as the plea is voluntary, a defendant's decision to waive the right to appellate review should not be
viewed as offending public policy. This author began his legal career
with several years experience practicing in busy urban criminal trial
courts. The hortatory comments quoted above strike him more as aspirational sentiments about how the system should operate than as
truly accurate descriptions of how it does, in fact, function. These descriptions neglect to account for the influence upon all the trial participants of the crushing caseload realities of modern criminal practice.
A more accurate description of what goes on in these courts is provided by Professor Alschuler's description of trial judges who "look
for guilty pleas the way that salesmen look for orders. '432 "They...
describ[e] prosecutors whose desire to 'move' cases, to maintain high
'batting averages,' to keep desirable job assignments, to please influential defense attorneys, and to avoid the wrath of trial judges sometimes leads to much more generous offers than a rational vectoring of
litigation risks could warrant. '433 The articles have also described
overburdened public defenders whose all but instinctive response to
most cases is the guilty plea as well as private defense attorneys whose
equally large caseloads lead them to plead virtually all of their clients
guilty, sometimes even deceiving their clients for the sake of turning a
fast buck. 434 Even if the truth lies somewhere between these contrasting descriptions, it is difficult to credit policy arguments which maintain that defendants who plead guilty have no need for appellate
review because the trial court process will adequately safeguard their
interests.
Ironically, this is exemplified by much of the current case law
concerning what will constitute a sufficient showing of voluntariness
to uphold a waiver of appeal rights. The cases are replete with exhor431.
432.
433.
434.

Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 290-91.
Alschuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1114.
Alschuler, supra note 127, at 690.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in PleaBargaining,84 YALE L.

. 1179, 1206-70 (1975).
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tations that appeal waivers will only be upheld if the waiver is made
"intelligently, voluntarily and with a full understanding of the consequences. 4 35 Trial courts are entrusted with the obligation of enforcing that requirement by careful inquiry into the defendant's decision
to waive his appeal rights and his understanding of the consequences
of doing so. Certainly, there are trial courts which do this quite conscientiously. For example, the district court judge in Navarro-Botello,
"carefully summarized the provisions of the plea agreement" to the
defendant and personally determined that the defendant understood
its contents and the rights he was waiving.436 But for many trial
courts, the plea process is much more of an empty ritual.
For example, many courts now rely on preprinted waiver forms
which defendants must sign and which often constitute the entire advisement process.437 In federal court, reliance is placed upon elaborate written plea agreements which are signed by counsel for both
sides and by the accused but which are almost always drafted by the
U.S. Attorney. Although defense counsel may negotiate concerning
the terms of the bargain, defense participation in the drafting of these
plea agreements is typically only slightly greater than that exercised
by the average consumer in the drafting of an installment sales
contract.
A controversy exists over whether trial judges must actually explain these forms to defendants to satisfy themselves that defendants
fully understand what they mean or whether the judge may simply
rely upon the fact that the defendant's signature appears on the dotted
line. Rule 11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that "the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court,
determining that a plea is voluntary and not the result of force or
threats or of promises apart from the plea agreement. '438 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit has held that where the district court judge
did not personally question the defendant about the appeal waiver
provisions of such an agreement, the waiver cannot be upheld if there
435. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 737 P.2d 250, 251 (Wash. 1987)
436. 912 F.2d at 321.
437. Typical of these forms is one utilized by the Marin County Superior Court in
northern California. This form reduces the entire appeal waiver advisement process to a
requirement that the defendant place his initials next to one of 17 different numbered
paragraphs, one of which reads "I understand that I have the right to appeal from the
judgment of this court. I waive my right of appeal and my right to attack the final judgment by any statutory or non-statutory means." (Form on file with author).
438. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
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is other evidence to suggest it was not knowing and voluntary.4 39 The

Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that such a Rule 11 colloquy by the judge is not necessary when there is written plea agreement.440 Many state courts agree with the Ninth Circuit in holding
that a waiver form is sufficient evidence of the voluntariness of an
appeal waiver without the need for any judicial inquiry.441
Of course, even judicial inquiry itself is no panacea. Formal questioning by a judge can be just as ritualistic and litany-driven as any
written waiver form. The reality of criminal trial court practice is
marked by a preoccupation with moving the caseload and this is particularly true with guilty plea cases. However, no matter how formalistic the voir dire by a trial judge, it is more likely to flush out cases
where the defendant does not understand what he or she is doing than
are written forms presented for his or her signature. Thus, when much
of the current case law fails to require that the trial judge "make the
minor investment of time and effort necessary... to demonstrate on
the record that the defendant understands" 442 precisely what is being
waived, it is difficult to share the optimism of those earlier cases which
assume that a defendant who pleads guilty has no need for appeal
rights because the trial court process will safeguard the defendant's
interests.
4. Finality
Many courts which have upheld appeal waivers on public policy
grounds have done so by emphasizing the need for finality in the criminal justice process. 443 Reasoning that plea bargains accompanied by
waivers of appeal rights enable the parties to "avoid the delay and
uncertainties of trial and appeal and permit swift and certain punishment of law violators," 4 " it is argued that "bargains fairly made
should signal an end to litigation, not a beginning. '445
439. United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991).
440. United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 980 F.2d 582, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1992).
441. See, eg., People v. Castrillon, 278 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Ct. App. 1991). Cf In re Ibarra,
666 P.2d 980, 984-85 (Cal. 1983). Both cases uphold reliance upon such forms despite the
United States Supreme Court mandate that when it comes to these sorts of inquiries, "Matters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling." McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 467 n.20 (1969) (citing Kennedy v. United States, 397 F.2d 16, 17 (6th Cir. 1968)).
442. DeSantiago-Martinez,980 F.2d at 584 (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 1992)).
443. See eg., Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 54; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322.
444. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1024.
445. lId
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Waiver of the right to appeal does, of course, tend to serve the
interests of finality. However, it does so at the expense of other important values. These values include accuracy and fairness of adjudication as well as the systematic and uniform development of the law
and its legitimation in the eyes of the public-in short, the purposes
served by appeals in general. In fact, at some level it could be said
that the goal of finality is inevitably in conflict with the very concept
of an appellate process. Appeals, by necessity, undermine finalityboth by forestalling the conclusive effect of trial court judgments and
by sometimes overturning those judgments, which often has the further effect of requiring yet more proceedings. The most efficient way
to promote finality would be to abolish the right to appeal altogether.
Despite the rhetoric of most appeal waiver cases, which is decidedly anti-appellate process, none has yet gone so far as to urge such an
extreme measure as the abolition of the right to appeal. 446 However,
the inevitable consequence of blanket encouragement of appeal waivers for plea concessions can only be a substantial decrease if not the
virtual elimination of appeals in those cases arising from guilty pleas.
Although there is substantial judicial opinion extolling this trend,
efforts to insulate most-if not all-guilty pleas from appellate review
are misguided. Guilty plea appeals raise significant issues. Why else
do they enjoy a success rate approaching 25%?

44 7

Moreover, guilty

plea appeals often raise sentencing issues which Congress and a
number of state legislatures have declared should be closely regulated
by the appellate process and which result in a high rate of appellate
relief.44 8 Most importantly, even if the case for pruning guilty plea

appellate calendars could be made, reliance upon appeal waivers as
the screening device is the least equitable way to go about doing it.
Appeal waivers eliminate cases on a basis which is not related to the
strength of the underlying appellate issues but rather to the attractiveness of the proffered plea concessions-a factor which may often bear
an inverse relationship to the merit of the appeal. Thus, although
widespread reliance upon appeal waivers may serve the interests of
finality by deterring the exercise of the right to appeal by those who
have pleaded guilty, it achieves these ends by ignoring, or substan446. Chief Justice Rehnquist has urged consideration of such an approach in comments
off the bench. These comments are critiqued, supra, in the text accompanying notes 253264.
447. CCAP Letter, supra note 364.
448. Even when guilty plea appeals raise nonsentencing issues, appellants achieve a
significant measure of success. See, e.g., NCSC, supra note 29. This is particularly true in
those jurisdictions which permit postplea appeals of suppression issues. Id. at 14.
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tially undermining, a competing complex of values which provides the
very rationale for the appellate process.
Supporters of appellate waivers dispute this reasoning. They contend that "the settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy," 44 9 and that negotiated plea dispositions are a satisfactory-if not
preferable-substitute for lengthy and time-consuming appellate resolution of legal disputes. We are told that "where a defendant, with the
participation of his attorney and the prosecutor, makes his own terms,
understands them, and thereby brings an end to a prosecution or
trial,""45 the final and prompt conclusion of litigation is a public benefit that far surpasses any that might be derived by fostering appeals.4 5 '
A major problem with this approach is that it presumes that defendants are in a position to make an adequate assessment of the issues on appeal and that any decision they make to forego these issues
should satisfy the court's independent interest in fair and accurate adjudication. This assumption may make some sense with regard to the
core question of guilt or innocence where the defendant may be the
best person to make a factual judgment on that issue. That is why the
Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea constitutes "an admission of
factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite
validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case."'45 However,
the same cannot be said for the legal issues which form the basis of
most appeals. To this question, the defendant brings no particular insight and, as one commentator has argued, "[n]othing the defendant
could say or do... could serve to certify the 'correctness' of the trial
court's sentencing decision,"453 or any other legal decision that provides the basis for an appeal.
The argument that the defendant's negotiated waiver of appeal
can provide a satisfactory substitute for judicial resolution of the issues raised on appeal is particularly unconvincing in any case that involves waiver of future, unknown sentencing error. Many
jurisdictions uphold such waivers, rejecting objections that it is impossible to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of unknown error.45 4
When the accused is negotiating blindly in this manner, not only is it
difficult to accommodate the plea to traditional definitions of knowing
449. Gibson, 348 A.2d at 775 (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 168 A.2d 72, 74 (N.J.
1961), cert. denied, 171 A.2d 147 (N.J. 1961)).
450. Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 291.

451. Id.
452. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2.

453. Johnson, supra note 115, at 710.
454. See, eg., Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318; Rutan, 956 F.2d 827.
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waiver,4 55 but the disposition provides virtually nothing to answer the
concerns of accuracy and fairness of adjudication that provide the basic justification for an appellate process.
Even if negotiated waivers of appeal rights could be viewed as
satisfying the error correction purposes served by appeals, they seem
necessarily to conflict with the broader institutional purposes of appeals. Finality is gained but only at the expense of uniformity, systematic articulation of the law, and legitimization of the criminal justice
system. Individualized deal-making may sometimes serve the interests of the litigants, but it is the antithesis of uniform decision-making.
Cases may be resolved more quickly and with greater flnalitV through
such a system, but brushing aside the appellate process deprives us of
a forum for the articulation and orderly development of legal doctrine. Lastly, backroom trades of appellate claims for charging and
sentencing concessions does little to reassure the public about the dignity and fairness of the process.
As the California Supreme Court observed many years ago, "the
state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments."456 Arguments which place finality and efficiency over concerns for accuracy
and fairness raise basic questions about the quality of justice being
administered. The current rush to embrace appeal waivers elevates a
criminal defendant's desperate search for clemency at sentencing to a
substitute for the judicial system's obligation to insure not only that
the defendant was treated fairly, but that the system operated equitably as a matter of institutional justice. The discussion of waiver of
appeal rights has been dominated by concerns of calendar control. It
is time to turn the debate back to issues of rights and accuracy of
adjudication.457
IV. Waiver of Sentencing Error
A. Introduction
Sections II and III of this article have developed due process and
public policy challenges to the use of appeal waivers which, if accepted, would prohibit reliance upon such waivers in all contexts. To
date, these arguments have not been eagerly embraced by most courts
which have heard them. Thus, this last section pursues the more lim455. Whether such a plea can withstand scrutiny under the waiver standard established

by Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), is analyzed in some detail, infra, in the text
accompanying notes 462-479.
456. People v. Henderson, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (1963).

457. See Arkin, supra note 47, at 521.

Fall 19951

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

ited question of whether courts which approve of the use of appeal
waivers in general should, nonetheless, disapprove of their use when
the underlying appellate issues are ones of sentencing error.
B.

All Sentencing Error

The first question is whether all sentencing error should be reviewable and, therefore, exempted from waivers. The error correction, uniformity, and law articulation purposes of the appellate
process have been repeatedly invoked by the drafters of most modem
sentencing schemes. 458 It is for this reason that most of those schemes
not only provide for appellate review of sentences but emphasize its
importance to the broader goal of avoiding "unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct."45 9 Thus, a mechanism such as appeal
waivers which permits the widespread circumvention of appellate review of sentences would seem to conflict directly with those policies
and should, accordingly, be disapproved.460
458. See supra notes 282-289 and 295-296.
459. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1994).
460. This argument was developed at length, supra,in the text accompanying notes 249281 and will not be repeated here except to note that Minnesota, the jurisdiction which
developed the first sentencing guidelines system and which has been at the forefront of
sentence reform, has reached precisely this conclusion and has held that the policies underlying its sentencing system prohibit the waiver of appellate review of any issues of sentencing error. Ballweber v. State, 457 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
With regard to waivers of sentence error under the Federal Sentence Reform Act, one
commentator has proposed a modification of the Ballweber approach-one which would
permit limited enforcement of appeal waivers under that act but withhold approval of
those which are clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the Act. See Johnson, supra note
115. Professor Johnson proposes that an appeal of a sentence waiver should be enforced
except where: (1) sentence was imposed in violation of the underlying substantive criminal
statute; (2) in imposing sentence, the trial judge considered factors that trial judges are
prohibited by law from considering (such as race or religion); and (3) in imposing sentence,
the trial judge committed "plain error" in violation of the Sentencing Reform Act. Id. at
719-720. This suggested approach could potentially eliminate some of the worst excesses
that are possible with unlimited enforcement of appeal waivers. However, there are definite limits to what it offers by way of a check upon improper sentencing choices. The first
two factors are arguably nothing new. Even those courts which give uncritical acceptance
to the use of appeal waivers assume that "illegal" sentences could always be appealed. See,
e.g., Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829; Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494; Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025.
Certainly that is what the first of these proposed exceptions contemplates and it is argued
that the second would also come within the definition of "illegal sentences" as well. See
infra note 476. It is the third of the proposed exceptions which would provide some constraint upon the use of appeal waivers in federal court that arguably does not exist at
present. However, the standard of "plain error" is notoriously imprecise, see, eg.,
CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 856 (2d ed. 1982), and
therefore provides little if any protection against the worst excesses. If we are to adopt an
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Waiver of Prospective Sentencing Error

Even if one rejects the blanket approach to sentencing error
adopted in Baliweber, there is a subspecies of sentence error which
courts should never allow to be waived-that is, the waiver of prospective error, the contours of which are unknown (and unknowable)
at the time of the waiver. As will be developed below, such waivers
are impossible to reconcile with traditional concepts of knowing and
intelligent waiver or with the basic policies that inform the right to
appeal.
1. Isn't all Sentencing ErrorProspective?
At one level, virtually all sentencing error is prospective when
viewed from the vantage point of the plea bargaining process where
appeal waivers are obtained. If the defendant has already pleaded
and been sentenced there is nothing to bargain over and thus plea
bargaining will inevitably precede the sentence process. The only exception might be the "packaging" of cases where the defendant obtains concessions in a new case in return for the waiver of sentencing
error that occurred in a past case. This is a rather infrequent
occurrence.
The real distinction that is being drawn here is not the one between future and past sentence error but rather the one between bargains that involve waiver of future, uncharted sentence error and
bargains that include a promise of a specific sentence (either in the
form of a specified term of years, a predetermined range of years or a
maximum term). These latter situations raise different questions and
are explored in subsections D & E below. This section is confined to
those situations where the defendant pleads "blind" and is asked to
waive all possible error that might be committed by the judge after
entry of the plea and appeal waiver. 461
approach which picks and chooses among which appeal of sentence error waivers will be
upheld and which will not, it is submitted that the approach proposed in subsections C, D
and E, below, would be fairer to the parties and easier to implement.

461. Courts split quite dramatically on this issue. Some reject all notions that the uncertainty of appellant's situation would render his waiver uninformed and provide blanket
approval of such waivers. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 830; Melancon, 972 F.2d at 569-70; NavarroBotello, 912 F.2d at 320. Jurisdictions such as California, on the other hand, have taken
virtually the opposite position, holding that defendants cannot waive unknown, future sentencing error, at least without an explicit statement that it is being waived. Vargas, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 451; Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26.
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2. The Concept of Knowing and Intelligent Waiver
The Supreme Court established the standard for knowing waiver
462
of trial rights more than half a century ago in Johnson v. Zerbst,
where it held that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.1 463 This has been
uniformly understood to mean that valid waiver of a right presupposes
an actual and demonstrable knowledge of the contours of the right
Most recently this standard has led at least
which is being waived.'
one appellate court to reject an appeal waiver as being unknowing
where the trial court did not specifically advise the defendant of either
his right to appeal generally or of his specific right to appeal a pretrial
465
motion to suppress evidence.
In recent years, the Court has softened this requirement in contexts outside the formal courtroom process, particularly in the area of
search and seizure. 466 However, in those very search cases where the
Court has departed from the Johnson v. Zerbst standard, it has emphasized the continuing vitality of that test as the one to be applied for
the waiver of "rights which the Constitution'4 67guarantees to a criminal
defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.
If there is one class of cases which has come to exemplify the
Court's insistence upon the need for strict application of the Johnson
standard to preserve fair trial rights it would have to be those cases
involving the taking of guilty pleas. Indeed, if there is any one theme
unifying the Court's guilty plea advisement cases from Boykin v. Alabama468 to McCarthy v. United States469 to Henderson v. Morgan,470 it
is that in order to enter a constitutionally valid plea, the defendant
must know precisely what is being given up as a consequence of the
plea. Boykin requires that the defendant be aware of the three essential constitutional rights being waived as part of the plea. 471 McCarthy
holds that the plea must be based on "an understanding of the law in
462. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
463. Id at 464.
464. See, eg., Jones v. Brown, 89 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Ct. App. 1970).
465. People v. Rosso, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 221 (Ct. App. 1994).
466. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that prosecution
need not show defendant's knowledge of right to refuse consent to demonstrate valid consent to search).
467. Id at 237.
468. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
469. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
470. 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
471. These rights are the right to jury trial, the right to confrontation, and the privilege
against self-incrimination. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
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relation to the facts."'4 72 Henderson requires that the defendant receive "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him'473 including notice of "critical" elements of the offense. 474
In recent years there has been some disagreement among the
lower courts as to what proof is required to demonstrate compliance
with these requirements. For example, despite Boykin's express statement that a knowing waiver of its three enumerated trial rights "cannot [be] presume[d] ...from a silent record," 475 a number of lower
courts have held that these rights do not explicitly have to be mentioned on the record to establish the knowing quality of the waiver.476
However, these same cases emphasize that they are merely rejecting a
talismanic requirement that the defendant engage in the ritual of mentioning each of these rights as part of his waiver. In each, the court
has emphasized that the record was sufficient to demonstrate that the
defendant was "not only aware of the rights discussed in Boykin, but
was fully aware of the consequences of waiving them. '477 Thus,
although these cases may relax the proof requirements for demonstrating that the Boykin standard has been met, they do not in any
way retreat from the basic message of Boykin which is that the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of knowing waiver is fully applicable to the plea
process.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Parke v.
Raley478 did not retreat from the knowing plea standard established in
Boykin. It merely created a presumption that this standard was complied with in a case presenting a collateral attack upon the plea many
years after the plea was entered. 479
Although this willingness to relax the proof requirements may, as
a practical matter, undermine the force of the Court's otherwise firm
insistence that Johnson v. Zerbst be given effect in the plea-taking
472. 394 U.S. at 466.
473. 426 U.S. at 645 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)).
474. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 n.18.
475. 395 U.S. at 243.
476. See e.g., United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 1976); Wilkins v.
Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974); People v. Howard, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (1992).
477. Wilkins, 505 F.2d at 764.
478. 113 S.Ct. 517 (1992) (upholding the validity of a plea despite the absence of any
stenographer's notes of the disputed plea colloquies).
479. A similar example of the Court's willingness to erect a presumption of compliance
with the Johnson v. Zerbst standard is provided by Henderson. There, the Court indicated
it might be appropriate to presume compliance with its requirement that the defendant be

informed of the nature of the offense from its expectation that defense counsel has probably, in most cases, explained "the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit." 426 U.S. at 647.
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context, it has no effect in the situation we are examining-i.e. waiver
of prospective sentencing error. That is because in such a situation we
are not dealing with whether we can presume the sufficiency of defendant's knowledge from a limited record. Instead, we are dealing
with a total absence of knowledge on the part of the defendant. There
is simply no way the accused can be viewed as knowing what he is
giving up as a part of his waiver because it has not been determined at
the time the plea is entered. Cases which emphasize reliance upon the
total record or the advice of counsel to demonstrate the knowing quality of defendants' pleas are simply inapposite. There is nothing that
counsel could tell defendant or that a larger record could disclose that
would demonstrate that defendant really understood the nature or the
magnitude of the sentencing error he was waiving because it has not
yet occurred. Thus, under current law, waivers of this sort simply cannot withstand scrutiny. Unless the Court is prepared to reconsider its
firm position that Johnson v. Zerbst controls the plea process, waiver
of prospective sentencing error cannot be justified under the
Constitution.
3. The Purposes of Appeal
Even if the Johnson v. Zerbst standard for knowing waiver did
not present such a significant hurdle to the approval of prospective
sentence error waiver, the policy arguments, developed at length in
Section III above, provide a particularly compelling impediment to
reliance upon such waivers when considered in this very problematic
context. It is often argued-or assumed-in many of the cases upholding appeal waivers that despite the important role that we assign
to the right to appeal, the defendant is always free to waive that right
and that, in the guilty plea context, such a waiver can serve as a sufficient substitute for the purposes otherwise served by the right to
appeal. 8 0
With regard to the error correction purposes of appeal, one frequently made argument is that the defendant can make a rational assessment of his likely success on appeal and weigh this against the
precise nature of what is offered to him by way of plea concessions.481
If this exchange is satisfactory to the defendant, it is argued that it
should equally satisfy the larger concerns of the system that error in
480. See, eg., Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322. This argument was specifically addressed in the text accompanying notes 243-330, supra, but will be revisited here briefly

because it is most open to question when it is directed at waiver of future sentencing error.
481. let at 320.
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the trial court not go uncorrected. Whatever attractiveness this argument might present in the abstract, it must fail in this context because
the defendant is in no position to engage in the weighing of alternatives that the argument presupposes-precisely because he does not
know one of the essential alternatives. To uphold serious legal error
in this situation on the ground that the defendant's assessment of the
error can satisfy our own demand for accuracy is sheer legal fiction
and should not be permitted.
With regard to the broader institutional purposes served by appeal, waivers that permit the court to overlook sentencing error that
has not yet been committed at the time of the plea present the greatest possibility for undermining the major purpose of most sentence
reform, which is the reduction of sentence disparity and the creation
of uniformity of treatment.8 Moreover, it is these kinds of waivers
which would seem least justifiable to the layperson and, therefore, the
most likely to undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. Thus, even if one is inclined to approve of appeal waivers as a
general matter of public policy, permitting their use to prevent defendants from appealing prospective sentencing error that could not
be anticipated is at odds with our most basic perceptions of why we
have an appellate review process. This particular form of appeal
waiver should simply never be permitted.
D.

Pleas for Specified Sentences

Assuming courts were to accept the previous reasoning and
adopted a rule disallowing appeal waivers of prospective sentencing
error, a reasonable exception to such a rule might be one which permitted waivers of this sort where the defendant bargained for a specific sentence and received that specified sentence. When the
defendant gets precisely what is bargained for it offends our basic notions of fairness to allow that same defendant to try to improve upon
the deal by means of appeal.
Of course, if one's position is that all sentence waivers violate
public policy then an erroneous sentence violates that policy whether
the defendant agreed to it or not. But if we assume a rejection of this
broad, per se approach and ask which classes of sentencing appeal
waivers are most or least defensible, certainly this latter class seems
482. For judicial articulation of this argument see United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d

478, 483 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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least troubling
in light of the policy considerations we have been
ha
exploring.4
1. Is the Issue Moot?
A preliminary question presented by appeal waivers in cases involving bargains for specified sentences is whether a defendant in such
a situation has any appeal rights to bargain away. In many jurisdictions, when a defendant pleads guilty in return for a specified sentence, courts simply will not entertain an appeal 484 either on the
theory that the plea agreement constitutes a complete and adequate
basis for imposition of the punishment specified 485 or on the theory
that the defendant is estopped from challenging its terms. 486 Thus, it
may be that such defendants simply have no appeal rights to exercise
and courts which have struggled with the validity of appeal waivers in
this context have overlooked a much simpler basis for resolution of
the issue.
2. Sentence Appeal Waivers in This Context Are Less Offensive
The primary factor which distinguishes appeal waivers for a specified sentence from the "blind" pleas discussed previously is that they
fit more comfortably into the Johnson v. Zerbst definition of a knowing and intelligent waiver.4 7 Here, the defendant knows precisely
what the consequences of his plea will be. Even if the manner in
483. Thus, it is not surprising to find precisely such an exception created in jurisdictions
which have adopted a general prohibition against waiver of prospective sentencing error.
California is a prime example. Although cases such as Vargas and Sherrick prohibit waiver
of future sentencing error in general, cases such as Nguyen permit waivers which involve
bargains for specific sentences. New York courts have similarly upheld appeal waivers
involving specific sentences, People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1992). However,
although New York agrees with California as to the validity of these specific waivers, New
York's disapproval of appeal waivers in general is much narrower than California's. New
York has limited its general disapproval of sentence appeal waivers to those involving "illegal" sentences. Seaberg, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 971. This latter term has been interpreted in its
narrow jurisdictional sense and has not been read to require the invalidation of waivers of
prospective sentence error. People v. Callahan, 604 N.E.2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1992).
484. See, e.g., Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495.
485. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 818. Cf. Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 440 (repealed 1991) (declaring such a negotiated disposition as constituting "an adequate reason for the imposition
of the punishment specified"). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(1) (1994), which provides that
"[iun the case of a plea agreement that includes a specific sentence under rule 11(e)(1)(C)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ... a defendant may not file a notice of appeal
under [18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3) or (4)] unless the sentence imposed is greater than the sentence set forth in such agreement."
486. People v. Jones, 258 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Ct. App. 1989).
487. See supra Section IV (c)(2).
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which the judge actually arrives at that sentence is open to challenge,
the defendant at least had full knowledge of what he was facing at the
time of the plea. Therefore, the concerns addressed in the previous
section do not apply with the same force.
With regard to the error correction purposes of appeal, there may
still, of course, be error. Given the complexity of most modern sentencing schemes, an agreement between counsel which is followed by
the court might still be in violation of what the law demands.4a However, when the defense and the prosecution make sentencing calculations independent of the court and when they and the court arrive at
an agreement as to what is required, a system of checks and balances
is created which may not provide a perfect substitute for an appeal but
does provide many of its safeguards.
It is somewhat more difficult to overlook the larger, systemic purposes of appeal in these situations, however. Erroneous sentences violate the overriding purposes of uniformity and nondisparate
treatment that are at the heart of most sentencing reform. The fact
that the parties have agreed to the sentence makes no difference. In
fact, negotiated dispositions which violate the dictates of the sentencing law present the potential for conscious evasion of these larger
goals of uniformity of treatment. Nonetheless, we are presuming at
this stage of the analysis that these broad systemic arguments have not
carried the day and that courts have chosen not to disallow all appeal
waivers of sentencing error. Thus, if some waivers are going to be
approved, those involving pleas where the defendant got precisely
what he bargained for are the least troubling from a public policy
standpoint.
3. Illegal Sentences

Even if we give general approval to most appeal waivers in this
context, there are a few constraints which should still apply. For example, sentences which are plainly illegal because they exceed what
the statute would permit should not be allowed, even if agreed to.
Most jurisdictions follow this principle 48 9 and this includes states
488. See, e.g., United States v. Kuhl, 816 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal. 1993), where counsel
and the court agreed that a sentence of 46 months was appropriate under the federal
guidelines. Subsequently, it was discovered that all were erroneously using a guidelines
manual which had not yet gone into effect. (This case and its Sixth Amendment implications are discussed supra note 78).
489. See, e.g., Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829; Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494; Seaberg, 541
N.E.2d at 1025.

Fall 19951

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

which uphold appeal waivers when the plea is to a specific sentence.49 °
In addition to illegal sentences, courts should also disapprove appeal
waivers for specific sentences when there is a claim that the judge, in
imposing sentence, utilized a factor such as race or religion which may
not lawfully be considered. 491 As Judge Marvin Frankel observed in
his enormously influential book on judicial sentencing practices, use
of such impermissible criteria would "fatally infect the judgment and
' '49
destroy its allowable character as an exercise of judicial discretion.
E. Pleas for a Sentence Range Within a Guidelines System
In sentencing guidelines schemes, a bargained plea is frequently
made to a negotiated sentence range 493 rather than to a specific term
of years. This is particularly true in the federal system where the
494
judge is prohibited from engaging in the plea bargaining process
and, therefore, from promising a specific sentence as part of the
bargain.
In a number of ways such pleas to a specified guidelines range
resemble pleas to a specified term of years. Although the judge's
range of sentence choice is obviously not as constrained by the terms
of the bargain as with a plea to a specified term, such a bargain does
place some limits upon the judge's choice and, thus, concerns about
the knowing quality of any appeal waivers are not as great as when the
defendant pleads completely "blind." However, what really distinguishes these kinds of plea agreements from the totally open pleas
that began this discussion is the discretionary nature of the sentencing
decision the judge makes as part of the disposition.
490. Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494; Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
491. United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478, 1480 (10th Cir. 1990). Cf.Wade v. United
States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992) (even a discretionary, nonreviewable decision of the prosecutor
not to make a substantial assistance motion under the federal sentencing guidelines may be
reviewed upon a showing that such a refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive such
as race or religion); Johnson, supra note 115, at 720.
492. Frankel, supra note 274, at 76.
493. An example is provided by the federal guidelines system. This scheme is structured around a sentencing table which is a grid consisting of two elements: the offense level
on the vertical axis and the defendant's criminal history on the horizontal axis. At the
intersection between each offense level row and criminal history column is a "cell" containing a presumptive sentencing range expressed in months (i.e., a range of 51 to 63 months
for offense level 22 and criminal history category II). This is what is referred to as a
guidelines range. The judge is expected to choose a sentence within this range. Phillis
Skloot Bamberger and David J. Gottlieb, Practice Underthe FederalSentencing Guidelines,
7-1, 7-5 (3d ed. 1994).
494. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(1).
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When a judge is choosing a specific term of years from a predetermined sentencing range, she is no longer expected to apply the immense body of statutory, regulatory and judicially created. case law
that is represented by the Sentencing Reform Act and its guidelines.
Neither must she make explicit legal rulings which may be measured
against these strict standards. Instead, the court is called upon to exercise its discretion.495 In doing so, it may consider "without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law, ' 496 in-

497
cluding "information that the guidelines do not take into account.1
This is a grant of discretionary decision-making power that is dramatically different from the complex, legalistic mode of adjudication that
is required of the judge in applying the guidelines themselves. It is the
kind of judgment that characterized virtually all sentencing determinations prior to the advent of sentence law reform,498 and it is the kind
of judicial determination that was traditionally viewed as being beyond the reach of appellate review. 99
Thus, so long as the judge, in exercising his discretion, does not
apply reasons for the sentence which are facially illegal, or make factual findings that are so clearly erroneous as to implicate due process
concerns," 0 the policies underlying the right to appeal have less force
in this arena and it may make sense to exempt appeal waivers in this
context from a general rule disallowing all waivers of prospective sentencing error.

1. Mootness

Of course, there is another way to view this-and that is to say
that a defendant who has made such a bargain simply has no appeal
rights to waive. There is dicta in at least one recent Supreme Court
opinion to the effect that a federal court's decision to impose a sentence at a particular point within the guidelines is simply not appealable05 1 because the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984502 did not provide
495. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992). Cf United States v. Colon, 884
F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Reed, 914 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1990).
496.

FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN. § 1B1.4.

497. Supra note 496, comment to § 1B1.4.
498. Hon. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Sentencing Reform and Appellate Review, 46 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 429, 437 (1989). Judge Wilkins, Chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commission makes precisely this point in arguing for nonreviewability of such decisions.

499.
500.
501.
502.

Id.
Garcia, 919 F.2d at 1481.
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 204-05 (1992).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3581, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998.
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for appeals from discretionary sentencing determinations. Much of
the lower court authority prior to that opinion was in accord. 3
2. Pleas to a "Cap"
It is the discretionary quality of judicial determinations made
within a predetermined guidelines range which also serves to distinguish plea agreements with such a condition from plea agreements
which are merely conditioned by a sentencing maximum or "cap."
Sentencing decisions made pursuant to the latter kind of bargain are
not made within a framework that calls for discretionary judgment;
quite the opposite is the case.
Although a "cap" places a limit on the ultimate term of years the
judge may choose, it places no limit on the type of judgment she is
called upon to make. Such a judge must still engage in the rule-driven
model of decision-making dictated generally by the guidelines. Her
discretion is accordingly limited and her sentencing determination is
subject to the full range of statutory constraints that would be true of
any other sentencing decision under the guidelines. This is precisely
the kind of sentencing decision to which the right of appeal found in
section 1342(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act was directed. Consequently, bargains for appeal waivers which would insulate these types
5 04
of sentencing decisions from judicial review should not be upheld.
Waivers as part of a plea to a "cap" are like waivers made in the context of "blind" pleas. They increase substantially the likelihood of aberrant sentencing determinations and undermine the very purposes of
sentence law reform.
V. Conclusion
Appeal waivers are now a dominant feature of the plea bargaining landscape. Once described as uncommon, they are now actively
encouraged and solicited as a solution to crowded appellate dockets.
503. United States v. Braslawsky, 913 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dugan,
912 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 914 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478 (10th Cir: 1990); United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550 (2nd
Cir. 1989). In this light it is interesting to speculate why the Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. Navarro-Botello, went to such lengths to uphold the appeal waiver in that case. The
defendant and the prosecutor agreed to a sentence range of 15 to 21 months and Mr.
Navarro-Botello received a sentence of 21 months. Thus, the court might simply have held
the sentence to be non-appealable under the statute.
504. In this regard, see United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 481-83 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Nelson, J., dissenting), where the judge adopted such reasoning to disapprove of appeal
waivers limited by a "cap," while indicating her willingness to approve appeal waivers to an
agreed-upon guidelines range.
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In many jurisdictions, such waivers are a virtual precondition to engaging in plea bargaining. Judicial approval of such bargains has been
widespread. Most courts have rejected the broad due process and
public policy objections which have been raised against their enforcement. In fact, most courts have found that public policy affirmatively
supports the practice of appeal waiver.
Reliance upon waiver doctrine as a means of calendar control is
troubling for many reasons. The solicitation of appeal waivers is inevitably tied to the adversarial goals of the parties in plea bargaining. In
such a context, the prosecutor will be most tempted to offer concessions for waiver of the right to appeal when the defendant has meritorious issues to raise on appeal. Consequently, the use of appeal
waivers has a tendency to screen out those cases we would most want
to see appealed.
To the extent that waivers are not bargained for in this case-specific manner, the alternative is frequently an across-the-board requirement that appeal rights be waived as a precondition to engaging
in plea bargaining. Used in this way, the practice has a tendency to
screen out both the meritorious and the unmeritorious claim on an
equal basis. Thus, viewed as a screening device, appeal waivers are
objectionable because they fail in any systematic fashion to eliminate
from the appellate docket those cases we would most like to see go
away.
However, the issues raised by appeal waivers go beyond practical
concerns over the effectiveness of the practice as a mechanism of calendar control. Despite widespread judicial opinion to the contrary,
the current use of appeal waivers raises fundamental issues of fairness
and public policy. These concerns go to the very heart of why we have
an appellate process as well as to the wisdom of our choice of plea
bargaining as the principle device for resolving criminal cases.
The due process attack upon appeal waivers is based upon the
conclusion that an inevitable result of routine bargaining for such
waivers is the placement of a heavy burden upon the free exercise of
the right to appeal. Several traditional strains of due process analysis
incorporate such a rights-burdening approach. 5 However, none has
ever been applied by the court to the process of plea bargaining. That
is primarily because the court views plea negotiation as a voluntary
process between participants of equal bargaining power wherein the
defendant is always free to reject any offer that might "burden" the
505. See supra text accompanying notes 123-168, discussing "chill" theory, "vindictiveness" theory, and the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions."

Fall 19951

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

available choices-whether it be the exercise of the right to trial or the
right to appeal.
This view of plea bargaining is open to serious challenge in light
of the changes which have occurred in sentencing law over the past
two decades. The move to determinate sentencing schemes has
strengthened the prosecutor's hand in plea bargaining immeasurably
and has rendered characterizations of level playing fields and equally
matched adversaries somewhat antiquated.
However, this leads not merely to a challenge of appeal waivers
but to a challenge of plea bargaining in general. Such a challenge
would require the Court to revisit entirely its approval of the plea
bargaining system. The Court has shown no inclination to do this. In
fact, it continues to view the practice as "an essential component of
the administration of justice. ''5 °6 Thus, although it could be argued
that appeal waivers provide the perfect vehicle for a wholesale reconsideration of plea bargaining (because they move us toward an administrative system of criminal case adjudication that utilizes neither trials
nor appeals), the argument is not likely to succeed in the current
climate.
The attack upon appeal waivers which provides a more reasonable possibility of effecting change is that which is grounded in public
policy. The public policy argument starts from the basic premise that
the right to appeal is "a fundamental element of procedural fairness as
generally understood in this country.150 7 The availability of appellate
review serves to guarantee fairness by advancing several distinct purposes. These include its principle function of error correction-assuring that mistakes in the lower court do not go unremedied. Appeals
also serve a variety of broader, "institutional" purposes which include
the articulation and systematic development of the law, the assurance
that the law will be applied with some degree of uniformity and, finally, the legitimation of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the
public.
Each of these purposes is seriously undermined by the approval
of a practice whose singular purpose is to entice appellantsto" give up
access to the right in order to obtain some measure of clemency. Certainly our demand for accuracy in the resolution of criminal cases can
never be satisfied by the substitution of a system of barter which bears
no necessary relationship to the merit of the underlying appellate issues (and which may, in fact, bear an inverse relationship to merit).
506. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
507. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 225, at § 3.10 commentary at 14.
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Our requirement that the criminal justice system treat all defendants equally and uniformly is necessarily frustrated by a process that
substitutes private deal-making for judicial resolution of questions of
law. This is particularly true with the guilty plea appeals which are the
focus of this Article. Sentencing issues dominate these appeals and
nondisparity of treatment was the major driving force behind virtually
all modem sentence law reform-including, in particular, the creation
of the right to appeal sentences. Furthermore, the legitimation function of appeals is also undermined by such waivers since there is simply no longer any institutional guarantee that serves to assure the
public, the accused or the key players in the criminal justice system
that aberrant trial court decisions will not be allowed to go
unremedied.
Thus, routine encouragement of waivers of the right to appeal
impairs the policies behind the right and should be disapproved. Unfortunately, most courts which have considered the matter have come
to the opposite conclusion. They have done so by relying upon a variety of contrary policy arguments, none of which can withstand close
scrutiny. For example, those courts which uphold the use of appeal
waivers often assume that most criminal appeals are frivolous. The
empirical data suggests otherwise. When one factors in sentencing relief, appellants are successful in upwards of 25% of defense appeals.50,
These figures compare favorably to the relief obtained by civil litigants and raise major questions about the wisdom of cutting off avenues of appellate relief.
Although criminal appellate dockets have grown significantly in
recent decades, most of this growth can be traced to decisions by criminal justice policy makers either to expand the right to appeal, to complicate criminal process or to increase the number of criminal :filingsall of which necessarily leads to increased appellate litigation. However, these same policy makers have failed to provide the increased
resources necessary to accommodate the effects of their policy
choices. Thus, the system faces a calendar control problem of its own
making, but looks elsewhere for the solution by limiting the rights of
criminal defendants to seek appellate relief. This is not only fundamentally unfair but unsound as a matter of public policy.
Advocates of increased reliance upon appeal waivers describe
them as an important bargaining chip for defendants in plea bargaining. Actual practice suggests, however, that rather than constituting a
508. See supra text accompanying notes 383-397.
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discrete item of exchange, surrender of appeal fights is often the price
of admission to plea bargain. Since few would seriously contend that
plea bargaining would cease if defendants were not free to waive their
appeals rights, it is difficult to believe that defendants would be deprived of an important benefit if we chose to disapprove of such waivers. However, even if some individual defendants were disadvantaged
by such a determination, the long range interests of criminal defendants in general (and the larger interests of the criminal justice system
as a whole) are furthered by the discontinuance of appeal waivers.
Waiver of appeal rights is also often justified on the grounds that
such waivers serve the important institutional goals of finality and efficiency. They do so, but only at the cost of other important goals most notably, accuracy and fairness of adjudication. A system of calendar control which relies heavily upon such a practice must ultimately raise fundamental questions about the quality of justice being
administered.
Finally, even if one rejects both the due process and public policy
critiques of appeal waivers and finds that their use should be approved
in general, there is one variant of the practice which should never be
approved-that is, prospective waiver of future sentencing error.
Such waivers offend both our most basic concept of knowing and intelligent waiver as well as the policy goals behind most modern sentencing reform.
The debate over appeal waivers has been unduly dominated by
concerns of calendar control. Appeal waivers are neither a:rational
nor a just means of limiting access to appellate relief. More significantly, their use illustrates the limits and ultimate weaknesses of a system which places such total reliance upon plea bartering as the basic
mechanism of criminal case adjudication. Finally, and most importantly, they undermine the fundamental principles that support the
right to appeal in a system devoted to procedural justice.

